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The Navy's influence on foreign policy through congressional committees, 1944-1961.

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THE NAVY'S INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 1944-1961

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PREFACE

This paper will investigate the influence exerted by the United States Navy through congressional committees on the formulation of American foreign policy following World War II. The events and decisions covered are limited to the period 1944 to 1961, except for an historic perspective extending back to the late nineteenth century.

The year 1944 was selected as the beginning of detailed investigation because the first formal committee hearings on postwar unification policy were held then. Since President John F. Kennedy's administration proved to be a watershed in American military policy it was decided to terminate this paper with a few observations on the effects of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's tour in office. The McNamara years in the Pentagon will require separate and special study, when objective historical perspective permits.

The interrelation of military policy and foreign policy since World War II logically leads to the realization that virtually every aspect of naval policy has some bearing on foreign policy. Instead of trying to cover too much area and do too little justice to any one aspect of military and foreign policy, two issues were selected for more detailed investigation in this paper. Congress was intimately involved

in the resolution of both of these issues, and they are good case studies in the political activity of naval officers after World War II.

The first is the "unification controversy" which has roots extending back to World War I and which influenced every subsequent development in military policy including military organization, the use of nuclear weapons, postwar defense organization and national strategy. The second issue concerns the change in the United States' attitude toward Spain after World War II, and how the Navy assisted the Congress in urging a change in American relations with Spain in the face of executive branch opposition.

A good part of the paper is given over to discussion on general issues which are necessary to an understanding of the Navy's role in politics. These include the naval officer's traditional perception of "politics," as opposed to the necessity of participation; the function of the Congress in foreign policy, and the relationship between the military and the legislative branch; and the activities of the "Navy lobby" in attempting to influence policy decisions through Congress.

A number of pertinent areas of Navy influence on policy through Congress were mentioned only briefly or were left out of this study, because of limited space, although they are equally as important as the issues included in the paper. These include nuclear policy, military aid and assistance, nuclear power for submarines and surface ships, the Polaris program, the Pacific Trust Territories and the budget policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

The broad issues of national strategy are treated very lightly, particularly President Eisenhower's "New Look," although the Navy and Congress were deeply involved.

One particular aspect of the Navy's influence on foreign policy is the ship loan acts passed after World War II, enabling friendly nations to maintain their navies when they were unable to afford to construct or buy naval vessels on their own. There was insufficient time to properly research this subject, and I intend to submit it as a possible PhD. dissertation topic for some time in the future.

The research conducted for this paper indicates there is a staggering amount of information to cover, and that little has been published in the general area of the military and politics. The more specific but still vast subject of the Navy and Congress after World War II offers great possibilities to the scholar and extensive research will undoubtedly reveal valuable conclusions on modern civil-military relations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Complete integration of United States foreign policy and military policy in contemporary politics is a reality. Assumption of free world leadership by the United States in the unsettled years since World War II has made very element of American power -- economic, military, social, political and technological -- integral to foreign policy.

The formulation of foreign policy is nominally a function of the executive branch of the government, which calls on Congress for funds necessary to support decisions to act and on the Senate to ratify treaties. The powers given Congress by the Constitution to raise and support the armed forces give the legislative branch further involvement in foreign affairs, since military policy is continually subject to congressional oversight.

Military officers have two means of exerting influence on national policy. The first and more "official" means is through the service chain of command, the civilian service secretary, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Broad military policy decisions are made in the executive branch by the Secretary of Defense and ultimately by the President. If service views are not accepted by the civilian leadership in the executive branch,

the military has the risky option of presenting their views to Congress through testimony before committees and through public relations and "legislative liaison" activities. The ramifications of these approaches to Congress will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Evaluating how much or even whether foreign policy is influenced through Congress results in purely subjective conclusions. Admiral Arleigh Burke, former Chief of Naval Operations, says, "the influence varies greatly due to personalities, the type of event itself, and the general state of the world."[1] Thomas Schelling, writing on deterrence and military diplomacy, says:[2]

> Every change in the defense budget, every selection of a major weapon system, every Congressional hearing of the annual budget of the armed forces, is diplomacy. It is diplomacy, because at least one strong motive behind any action taken is to communicate something to the leaders of potential enemy countries about what we can do and about what we will do.

Essentially, what is said publicy by the American government, executive or legislative branches, contributes to American foreign policy as other nations understand it. This applies not only to potential "enemy" countries. The disposition of military forces, political bargaining,

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1. Letter from Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U. S. Navy (Retired) to the author, dated March 11, 1968.

2. Thomas C. Schelling, "Deterrence: Military Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn, 1963, reprinted in Conduct of National Security Policy, selected readings, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Subcommittee on National Security and International Relations, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G. P. O., 1965), p. 44.

policy statements, alliances, economic policy, and propaganda may foster the growth of friendly factions within foreign governments.[3]

In addition, Congress is now more deeply involved with military policy-makers within the services. The high level of defense activities required by the Cold War increased congressional interest in military policy and administration. The locus of congressional-military relations expanded from the supply units of the military departments with their attendant "spoils" opportunities to include the professional heads of the services. Congress is seemingly more interested in the strategic effects of military materiel funded through appropriations, although the lure of constituent "pork-barreling" has not decreased.

Increased interest notwithstanding, Congress is still at a disadvantage relative to the Executive in the making of foreign policy. Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, refers to the power over information and the "plethora of expertise" that give to the Executive what might be called "the intellectual initiative in foreign policy." Congress can criticize, add to, amend, or block an action by the Executive, Hilsman says, but can rarely succeed in forcing the Executive's attention to "the need for a change in policy," and can hardly ever develop and secure the adoption of an alternative

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3. John Wesley Masland and Laurence Ingram Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 26.

policy of its own.[4]

If Congress as a whole is more interested in military policy the real support in Congress in behalf of the military stems from a few active, hard-core supporters. A Congressman or Senator who consistently backs military programs usually has a strong sense of identification with one or another of the military services. This identification can usually be traced to one or more of the following: first, the Congressman has enjoyed a fairly long-term, gratifying relationship with the service concerned; second, he has been a member of the House or Senate Military Affairs Committee, or the Military Appropriations Subcommittee; third, he might have served military duty in the service's active or reserve component; finally, the service concerned maintains key installations in the legislator's constituency.[5]

In spite of the legislator's interest in military policy the armed services are still faced with a dilemma -- military security. The military wants to minimize the danger of internal politics within the services which would surely result if every self-declared spokesman was free to air his opinions to Congress. The military also hesitates to bring up highly-classified material even in closed committee session, considering

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4. Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy, Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, eds. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), p. 189.

5. Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 86.

the laxity of many Congressmen and Senators in regard to such information. While some of the leakage from Congress results from indiscretion, members of Congress who disagree with administration policies may leak information in the hope public disclosure will cause a project to be abandoned.[6]

Until recently military officers were faced with restrictions that transcended security. The possibility that testimony not in sympathy with administration policy could curtail a promising career also prevents officers from speaking out on issues before Congress. The provision in the National Security Act of 1949 permitting a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to Congress "on his own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper"[7] was a legal milestone in the shift from the prewar pattern. This provision was the first in the United States statutes which authorized a military chief to take his opinions directly to Congress. In spite of the law, the old restriction still holds true. President Truman dismissed his Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfield, in 1949 after the "Revolt of the Admirals."

Regarding pressure from the Executive, Morris Janowitz believes the Chiefs of Staff have shown "considerable political responsibility"

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6. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 237.

7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957), pp. 415-416.

in expressing opinions to Congress, "while at the same time demonstrating their loyalty to the Secretary of Defense and the executive branch of the government."[8] Military leaders do not particularly enjoy walking this tightrope, but military officers in recent years have become less politically naive, and in some cases have been willing to take career risks to air the policies of their services before Congress. Regardless of their own careers, and in spite of increasing political awareness, military officers must avoid intentionally embarrassing the administration or straying beyond their field of expertise into those of politics and diplomacy. Since Congress lacks the "initiative" in policy-making, as Roger Hilsman remarked, the legislature is confined to exercising "oversight" of the executive branch, hopefully distinguishing between scrutiny of the executive's performance and interference in administrative operations. Senator Joseph S. Clark summed up the oversight function as follows:[9]

> Oversight, by legislative and investigating committees, through the annual appropriations process and the almost daily contact of individual Congressmen with the bureaucracy, enables Congress to maintain at least some control over what is going on in the far-flung and enormous executive branch.

The value of congressional hearings goes beyond the "watchdog"

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8. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 359.

9. Joseph S. Clark, Congress: The Sapless Branch (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 84.

function, to include the following: first, hearings provide the best means for educating the public on political issues, often described by members of Congress as the most important result of hearings. Second, hearings alert the voters to a particular measure under consideration, providing them with the opportunity to make their wishes known in advance of congressional action. Third, congressmen can use hearings to publicize their own views, particularly in opposition to the policies of the Administration. The recent Fulbright Committee hearings on United States commitments abroad are a good example. Finally, committee hearings afford the opportunity for members of Congress to obtain information and understanding of proposed legislation.

While committee hearings perform a valuable function as a public forum, presenting divergent views on important issues, the mundane day-to-day work of the committees is essential to the functioning of the legislature. Senator Thomas Dodd and Representative Carl Albert explained the importance of congressional committees to a reporter:[10]

> No individual could hope to become fully informed on the hundreds of complex questions upon which Senators must vote each year. Members of the committees concerned with these questions can become thoroughly informed, and a Senator must frequently rely upon the judgment of the committees. . . .
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> Congress, like most large organizations, functions through a division-of-labor method known in this case as the committee system. Members must

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10. "What's Wrong With Congress -- 118 Members Answer," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 49, No. 11, September 12, 1960, p. 60.

> trust their colleagues to specialize and to do the necessary research and conduct the necessary investigations in the various fields.

Most of the shaping of legislation is done in committee rooms. The large number and complexity of legislative proposals, the tradition in Congress of deferring to the "specialist," the search for ways to accomodate conflicting pressures on congressmen, the size of Congress--all conspire to increase the authority of committee action. According to a study on congressional committees, 90 per cent of all the work in Congress on legislative matters is carried out in committee.[11]

Congressional influence on military matters is exerted most effectively through the Subcommittees on Military Appropriations. "The military budget is the single most important annual contact between the military and Congress," writes Samuel P. Huntington. "It affords Congress the opportunity to consider and lay down the broad lines of military policy and to review in exhaustive detail military procedure and administration."[12] Congress cannot force the Executive to act, as illustrated by the money appropriated and earmarked for the RS-70 bomber, which the administration refused to spend. But Congress can use appropriations committee meetings to review and criticize administration policy. The early 1963 Senate Subcommittee on Military Appropriations reviewed in detail the government's actions during the

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11. Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1963), p. 213.

12. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 407.

Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Appropriations committees may subject legislation to a kind of "double jeopardy," as usually separate appropriations acts are required to put into action programs authorized by legislation originating in other committees.[13]

Considering the importance of congressional committees in shaping the country's foreign and military policies, the complexity of the legislative process, and the "adversary" theory inherent in the separation of powers, how does the professional military officer thread his way through the morass? Two examples of military influence on foreign and military policy will be discussed in subsequent chapters: the "unification controversy" and the debate on national military strategy that began during World War II, and the initial political maneuvers that led to the installation of United States military facilities in Spain in the 1950's. The interests and political activities of U.S. Navy officers in each of these controversies will be stressed.

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13. Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 42.

CHAPTER II

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS

Military tradition in the United States dictates that the professional officer is "above politics" in domestic affairs. In an authoritarian society, to be above politics means that the officer is committed to the status quo; under democratic theory being "above politics" requires that officers do not attach themselves to political parties or overtly display partisanship.[1]

In the United States, federal law as well as strong tradition preclude career military officers from the active role in domestic politics enjoyed by other citizens.[2]

The framers of the Constitution, in establishing the American political system, devised the "separation of powers" to prevent executive branch dominance in the Government; too often an authoritative head of state found much of his strength and support in his army. Although the President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the Armed

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1. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 233.

2. Robert A. Lovett, "Role of the Military Services in Government," Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy, Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, eds. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), p. 403.

Forces, these forces can be raised and supported only by Congress.

These Constitutional restrictions entered the American conscious and took shape as a recurring distrust and dislike of "the military." The American public tends to believe that military officers are neither trustworthy nor competent to become involved in politics. Professor Huntington presents this thesis in saying:[3]

> Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values. The military officer must remain neutral politically.

The United States Navy, more consciously aware of tradition than the other services, has been fairly meticulous over the years in keeping its officer corps "above politics." Vincent Davis, a student of the military and politics, believes that naval officers' "broader sense of isolation" characterizes the thinking of seafaring men everywhere. More directly, Davis says, their rejection of political activity reveals how thoroughly American naval officers have been influenced by the Navy's history and "with the traditional American belief that the armed forces as well as individual military officers should in no sense engage 'in politics.'"[4] Admiral George Dewey succinctly stated the Navy's attitude on politics

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3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957), p. 71.

4. Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 8-9.

when he said: "The Navy is one profession, politics another. . . ," although he did profess interest in a possible Presidential nomination in 1900.

Naval officers' alienation from domestic politics is based on more than adherence to the almost mystical persuasion of naval customs and traditions. The United States is no longer the sea-oriented maritime nation of the early eighteenth century. Those Americans who follow the sea feel isolated from the changing tempers of contemporary society, and misunderstood by the public at large. As a result, many in the officer corps profess a measure of scorn for "politics" and "politicians."[5]

However, the realities of the American political system compel most United States government bureaucrats to feel they must participate in an internecine struggle for survival.[6] The government bureaucracy includes the military, at least in Washington. Consequently, military officers are encouraged by tradition and regulations to think and talk as if they were not in politics, although the system causes them to feel compelled to participate.[7]

In addition to the requirements of Washington's bureaucracy, the military realized after World War II that they could not articulate in a

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5. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "The Professional Officer and Foreign Policy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 90., No. 7, July, 1964, p. 70.

6. Davis, The Admirals Lobby, p. 4.

7. Ibid.

vacuum the complex issues of foreign aid, defense planning, mutual security, and scientific research that have become necessary elements in the profession of arms. The tightening of civilian control of the military after World War II and the rising importance of constantly-changing technology have largely destroyed the professional military officer's romantic position "above politics."

The recent turn of some of the professional military toward politics is explained by Harold Stein by three phenomena of the post-war era. First, the sheer monetary magnitude of the modern American military effort. Men who are responsible for persuading Congress to appropriate billions of dollars for defense live in a highly-charged political atmosphere regardless of the strong hand of civilian control exercised by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and several thousand other civilians.

Second, the abandonment of America's isolationist traditions and the consequent merging of the military and diplomatic spheres of concern in such commitments as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Stein's third reason is the frustration of the stalemate in Korea, "neither victory nor defeat," which continues to trouble American military leaders, particularly in comparison with Viet Nam.[8]

Whatever the reasons, the professional military officer of the

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8. Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), p. 13.

present finds himself in consultation with civilians on the military aspects of foreign policy. The political side of American military leadership is described as follows by Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense:[9]

> The primary function of career military officers in national policymaking, apart from their obvious administrative, staff and command responsibility, is that of advising on military policies and of preparing detailed strategic plans as part of the complex of specialized advice from which an overall national policy can be evolved.

The ascendency of military considerations and military advisors in the formulation of American foreign policy has again raised the spectre of that creaky fantasy, "the military mind." Although civilian control of the military establishment in the United States has never been more complete, opposition to military decision-making continues. The most serious criticisms of the "military mind" appear to be of alleged tendencies toward: (1) rigidity in thought and problem analysis; the rejection of new ideas and reliance on tradition rather than lessons learned from recent experience; (2) inadequate weighing of nonmilitary factors, and inability to understand complex politico-military relationships; (3) an authoritarian approach to most social issues and situations, accompanied by disrespect for and disregard of civilian authority; (4) insulation from nonmilitary knowledge and anything beyond what is narrowly defined as militarily relevant; (5) judgment of policy goals and

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9. Lovett, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy, p. 404.

techniques primarily in terms of military force and military strategy.[10]

In fact, according to Walter Millis, "the 'military mind' . . . did not seem, when it reached the highest levels of responsibility and authority, to be markedly different from the diplomatic or legal or business mind."[11]

Because the American people still distrust the military, there is concern over the possibility of the military elite undermining, by virtue of growth in power, control by civilian authority. Constitutionally and traditionally this is a "straw man" as far as American political realities are concerned. Since the immediate danger of a "Communist monolith" seems to have abated over the past few years, only extreme anti-military fringe groups fear the prospect of sacrificing political liberty to obtain security against communism.

Still, the spectre of "militarism" has long had its effect on American domestic politics, and has been a potent influence in blocking the strength and development of our armed forces.[12] Much of this feeling can be traced to the old frontier independence of the nineteenth

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10. Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 19-20.

11. Walter Millis, with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), pp. 140-141.

12. C. Joseph Bernado and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1955), p. 492.

century, and to the nascent isolationism that remains a factor in national politics. The autocracy of military organization and the absolute right of seniority is contrasted with democratic procedure relying on popular consent. Actually, America's military leaders have never disputed their subordination to civil authority.

In fact, there is no question that the civilian elected officials of the government exercise absolute control over the military. Three major devices of control are at the disposal of the civilian administrative authorities: budget control, the allocation of missions and responsibilities to the various services, and the responsibility of civilian leaders in the military establishment to advise the President and the State Department on the military aspects of international relations.

Walter Millis gives an accurate account of the current situation in the making of foreign policy:[13]

> . . . it is not the military men who determine the basic structure of our military defense, nor is it the civilian public, the civilian editors, the civilians in Congress, none of whom is any longer allowed to know enough about the vital data to exert much influence on the course of policies based upon them . . . . the power resides, not in the uniformed officers, but in the civilian and political appointees of the Administration -- the Secretaries of State and Defense, their numerous Assistant Secretaries and staff men, the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of the Budget, the White House Special Assistants, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Defense Mobilization and many more.

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13. Millis, Arms and the State, p. 401.

Given the constitutional and traditional bases for civilian control of the military, there is an additional factor -- the attitude of the officer corps toward authority. There is a strong feeling among officers to keep the professional military ethic free of tarnish from politics. This produces some strain, as the need to fulfill a creative role in national policy is recognized by military leaders. Therefore the military puts a good deal of faith in the dedication and sincerity of its civilian superiors. Military officers believe that their advice is necessary in the formulation of national policy and that it will be honestly considered by the civilian decision-makers.

The rationale of civilian control is expressed by Harry L. Coles as follows:[14]

> It rests on two forces of unequal strength: a long historical heritage based on fear of usurpation and tyranny, and a logical analysis of the relationship between force and society. By far the stronger of these in shaping Anglo-American attitudes is the liberal, anti-military tradition. By far the more relevant under present conditions is the logical concept of the primacy of politics in the affairs of states.

There is a danger in tight civilian control of the military that is seldom discussed by political writers, and never mentioned publicly by the military. This is the danger that military officers might become politically dominated, and their professional standards subordinated to partisan considerations. The Jackson Subcommittee on National Security

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14. Harry L. Coles, ed., Total War and Cold War (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962), p. 4.

and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations presented the problem clearly in a memorandum prepared in 1965. The memorandum referred to "a great national tradition which has served us well," that military and foreign service officers should constitute independent, non-political professional corps, free of political domination in the presentation of their views, not only within the executive branch but also before Congressional committees.[15] The Jackson Subcommittee, realizing that military officers owe allegiance to their Commander in Chief, and to the policy decisions set down by his appointed administrators in the executive branch, wants the military to give candid professional opinion when called to appear before Congressional committees.

This imposes quite a strain on the individuals concerned, particularly when an officer's personal opinion or the opinion of his service is at odds with any Administration policy. The problem is best illustrated by the "revolt of the Admirals" in 1949 when the Navy went all out in support of its supercarrier, cancelled by the Secretary of Defense in favor of the Air Force's controversial B-36 bomber. Although the Navy was later vindicated by the Korean War, Admiral Louis E. Denfield, Chief of Naval Operations, was dismissed by President Truman

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15. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Conduct of National Security Policy, Initial Memorandum prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 89th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G.P.O., 1965), p. 6.

and forced into retirement.

In spite of the strained loyalties referred to above, and unofficial but ever-threatening dangers to an officer's career that might come from speaking out, the separation of powers between the Executive and Congress does allow some maneuvering by military spokesmen. These possibilities will be explored in a later chapter.

The requirement by Congress for frank and honest opinion from the military is expressed in the Jackson Subcommittee memorandum:[16]

> The ability of Congress to avail itself of exact information and honest testimony is essential to its intelligent appraisal of national problems, to its enactment of wise legislation, to the discharge of its constitutional responsibility for financial control of the federal budget -- including the defense budget -- and, also, to make it possible for Congressional study and debate to be a constructive element in the education of the American people.

The end of World War II found the United States the strongest nation in the world -- politically, militarily and economically. The evolution of East-West polarization in the "cold war" and the continuing central role of the United States in the widening spectrum of warfare established the fundamental interdependence of its foreign and military policies. No longer is military power merely an "extension" of foreign policy; inadequacies in national military strength may make it difficult

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16. Ibid., p. 7.

or impossible to follow certain courses of foreign policy.[17] The interrelation of foreign policy and military policy is suggested by some of the current major problem areas in American foreign policy: the military and political future of NATO; the status of Berlin; the hope for an equitable solution in Viet Nam; arms control and disarmament; and military assistance programs in underdeveloped nations.

More explicitely, effective use of military techniques and military doctrine depends on direction and coordination from a general framework of foreign policy -- military policies must not become ends in themselves. Foreign policy is superior to military policy in that military considerations must not determine what national objectives are appropriate. To successfully attain the goals determined through policy decisions, foreign policy and military policy must be coordinated.[18]

The ultimate test of America's military establishment, therefore, is how well it serves our foreign policy.[19] The military has become more aware of this aspect of modern military professionalism. Officer training is expanding beyond the technical to include international relations and political science, to enable the military to contribute more

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17. Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 135.

18. Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, p. 9.

19. Adam Yarmolinsky, The United States Military Power and Foreign Policy, The University of Chicago Center for Policy Study (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967), p. 8.

substantially to foreign policy decision-making. A naval officer made this point in a professional service magazine: "Foreign policy making at the highest level is and will continue to be a major -- perhaps in time the major -- preoccupation of the armed forces.[20]

United States foreign policy and military policy have been drawn together since World War II into a new classification -- "national security policy." This is a multifaceted enterprise of great complexity, with the ultimate purpose of fulfilling the vital interests of the United States in a hostile world. Military strategy is no longer devised to merely carry out national policy. The distinction between the two has been virtually eliminated. Decisions formerly left to the military -- choices about weapons systems and force levels, as well as contingency planning -- are matters of fundamental concern for foreign policy makers. Military participation in foreign policy decisions has progressed from merely giving military "advice" when asked, and then stoically acting on the resultant civilian decisions, to participation of military leaders in the decision-making process.

Foreign policy which ignores military power cannot be effective. It is equally true that foreign policy constricted by preferences for ideal military conditions is fruitless and short-sighted. The necessity for a continuing series of less than optimal choices is now widely recognized by both military and civilian leaders.

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20. Lerche, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July, 1964, p. 70.

The amalgamation of foreign policy and military strategy into national security policy has resulted in more civilian influence in military decisions, and greater military contributions to decisions in the area of "foreign policy." This last development causes anti-military elements in the country to overlook the realities of civilian control of the military, believing that American foreign policy is almost totally conditioned by the cold war and almost totally subordinated to military considerations.[21]

There is a real problem involved in the rising military voice in foreign policy. In the military, policy is inseparable from program. In the civilian political sphere, policy too often becomes a substitute for program.[22] Civilian statesmen too often feel that a problem will solve itself once a policy has been determined, and may overlook the details of action necessary to execute the policy. Military solutions on the other hand may be necessarily short-range, defensive and time-buying, obscuring the need for a detailed, long-range, non-military program. This problem can arise in crisis situations, when often the only available solution to a problem will be presented by the military, with its propensity for detailed contingency plans and the ability to bring enormous resources to bear in a short time. The civilian leadership

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21. John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 138.

22. Yarmolinsky, The United States Military Power and Foreign Policy, p. 22.

may thus be forced to give a program to the military merely because the military can execute decisions and marshall forces more rapidly than civilian agencies. This may be true even when both the military and the civilians agree that it would be preferable that the military not be given the responsibility.

There are some positive aspects to the military approach to foreign policy decision-making. The military traditionally emphasizes the necessity of solving problems, rather than merely enduring their consequences; civilian politicians tend to delay commitment until only one course of action is feasible, thus avoiding personal responsibility for the consequences. The military requires that decisions must be operational, that making the decision is not enough to bring desired results. Finally, military officers have no political base through elections or appointments; their first loyalties lie with the nation and their service. Military personnel are more able to place national interest above personal, group, regional or party concerns.

On the negative side, military decisions are best made to devise methods to reach already stipulated objectives, but the decision-making process is less facile in the related tasks of selecting national goals and defining foreign policy objectives. There is a strong tendency to search for doctrinal standard responses to an unknown variety of circumstances.[23]

In evaluating the effect of military decision-making on foreign

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23. Lerche, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July, 1964, pp. 72-74.

policy, Morris Janowitz presents two theories on how military force should be used to achieve political objectives. The first is labeled the "absolute" doctrine and reflects the traditional, simplistic approach to problem-solving. Those of the absolute school see warfare -- actual or threatened -- as the fundamental basis of international relations. Therefore, the more complete the victory in warfare, the greater the possibility of achieving political goals. In short, there is no substitute for "total victory." The inadequacy of this doctrine was proved by the Cold War, and confirmed by the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis, and the war in Viet Nam. Janowitz' "pragmatic" school emphasizes the revolutionary character of atomic energy, and the discontinuity of the military past with the future. The pragmatists see warfare as but one instrument of international relations, inexorably combined with the ideological and economic struggle.[24]

Military influence on foreign policy is exerted in two ways -- through the administrative channels of the Executive, via the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through Congress and extra-governmental channels by means of the "military lobby." The basic purpose of this paper is to explore the Navy's influence on foreign policy through congressional committees. The Navy's efforts will be explored in depth in subsequent chapters. The following paragraphs will deal briefly with the general import of service lobbying.

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24. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 264.

"Lobbying" as carried out by the military differs substantially from the lobbying practices of industry and other special interest groups. The military's effort is more accurately described as public relations, since the military has no political base from which to operate and neither desire nor means to bring political pressure on Congress.

Opinions on the extent and effectiveness of the military lobby vary. Walter Millis believed that "the armed services had never been a political force of any consequence in themselves" yet the officer corps of the services "unavoidably constituted interest groups, each supported by powerful private industrial interests."[25] It should be realized that there is no devious connection between the military and industry, in spite of President Eisenhower's warnings about the "military- industrial complex." The arms industry is in the business of selling arms, and tries to anticipate or even precipitate the needs of the various services. Even retired military officers are prevented by federal law from lobbying on behalf of industry.

Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, apparently does not agree with either Millis or President Eisenhower. He told a New York Times reporter, "the armed services do not have unions. They do not have legislative representatives in Washington. They are unable to lobby among members of Congress."[26]

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25. Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: Capricorn Books, 1956), p. 306.

26. C. P. Trussell, article in the New York Times, July 10, 1964, p. 1.

The Senator is correct, in the narrow definition of lobbying, but the military does maintain close and continuing contact with Congress through legislative liaison officers, to provide whatever information and assistance is possible. The services are anxious to foster attitudes in Congress and the public at large which are favorable to their programs.

Just as important as the services' public relations efforts are appearances of military personnel before congressional committees to answer questions. These appearances are based on something more explicit than the public's "right to know." Congress is responsible under the Constitution for raising and supporting the armed forces. Not only the armed services and appropriations committees are involved in legislation concerning the military. The government operations committees concern themselves with the administrative efficiency of the services; the aeronautical and space science committees oversee the space programs; the judiciary committees watch military policies and practices in the field of individual rights; the foreign relations committees are concerned with military power as an element of foreign policy; the Post Office and Civil Service committees observe practices affecting civilian employees; and the Joint Atomic Energy and Joint Defense Procurement committees exercise self-evident interest in defense programs.[27]

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27. Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 201-202.

Much of the testimony of service personnel before the committees is presented as "personal opinion," to avoid the suggestion of disloyalty if they are in conflict with Administration policy. Many of the questions are worked out in advance with cooperative Congressmen.[28] In any case, answers to Congressional questions are candidly intended to influence legislation, and carefully phrased to advance service viewpoints. Robert S. McNamara's tour as Secretary of Defense has brought about more emphasis on Department of Defense programs by military spokesmen, and fewer parochial views of individual services. This has come about partly through McNamara's firm control of the services, but mainly through the Planned Program Budget System through which Congress is asked to consider Defense Department systems which cut across individual service responsibilities. Also, military security procedures normally insure that those officers who testify before committees are not likely to present opinions substantially different from Defense Department policy.

In spite of Secretary McNamara's effective clamp on potentially outspoken military leaders, the services' burgeoning public relations and legislative liaison programs cause some uneasiness in those observers sensitive to the remote possibility of unwanted military influence in national politics. According to Professor Huntington, the declining threat of a Soviet Union-United States nuclear confrontation

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28. Ibid., p. 203.

caused weakening of the external requirements shaping the size and character of the armed forces; the impact of domestic considerations and the pressures of industrial, regional and popular groups in influencing policy increased.[29]

The new public relations pursued by the services is seen as potentially threatening the system of political balance. "An organ of government lobbying on its own behalf -- especially one which deals with such a vital function -- is difficult to contain," according to Morris Janowitz.[30] These fears are unfounded, as professional military officers are effectively contained by their civilian superiors, and by their own image of the military as being "above politics."

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29. Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics, p. 14.

30. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 392.

CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

American naval policy from the Revolutionary War to the late nineteenth century was static, emphasizing commerce raiding and local coastal defense. Although periodic efforts were made to expand American naval power, they were defeated by desire for economy in government spending and fears that the extension of American military power overseas would involve the country in European political intrigues.[1] Both commerce raiding and coastal defense were essential to any system of naval strategy, but neither was in itself adequate to cope with situations in which a maritime nation might become involved.[2] The expansion of naval forces in ships and men during the Civil War merely gave the Navy an increased blockading and cruiser capability, and the end of the war found the service returning to obscurity.

The "New Navy" began to evolve in the 1880's, when it was realized that American naval power rested in obsolete ships and

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1. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1775-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 38-62.

2. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940), p. 7.

ineffective organization. A new class of cruisers was authorized by Congress in 1883, which would at least provide a transition between the old wooden ships still in service, and armored vessels with modern gun systems being developed in Europe. Even new equipment would be ineffective, however, as long as the doctrine called for stopping an enemy at the coast. The ancient strategic ideas of most of the Navy's senior officers, some of whom still believed that no ship should be built without rigging for sails, were shared by members of Congress. There was strong support in Washington for limiting ship design to fast, commerce-raiding cruisers and immobile, heavily-armored monitors for harbor defense. These doctrinal concepts were strengthened by the country's geographical and political isolation, which would limit American efforts to the Western Hemisphere.[3]

A "revolution" in naval strategic doctrine was in the offing when Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan assumed duties on the faculty of the new Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, opened the previous year by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce. Mahan would have tremendous influence on thinking within the naval service, and would be championed by the emerging "imperialist" politicians Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. Mahan argued for centralization of naval forces to permit the United States to meet a threatening foreign naval force far from American shores in decisive fleet engagements.

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3. Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1775-1918, pp. 183-197.

Mahan's call for centralization of naval organization and operations of the fleet met resistance both in the Navy and in Congress. Opposition from his fellow officers came from the instinctively anti-intellectual "Old Guard" who assumed that an efficient naval officer by definition was not an intellectual. Mahan's quite respectable technical skills and seamanship were unfairly criticized, particularly after his books on naval history and sea power became popular in Europe, and later in his own country.[4] Mahan's criticism of the Navy's organizational decentralization was strongly resisted by the heads of the virtually autonomous "bureaus" through which the business of the service was conducted.

The primary opponents of centralization outside the Navy were located in Congress. During the nineteenth century, naval appropriations were regarded mainly as a particularly useful and attractive form of the "pork barrel." An excessive number of shipyards were maintained, to build and maintain navy ships at inefficient costs. Congressmen and Senators were loath to give up these excellent means for putting government money into their constituencies. Harold and Margaret Sprout give the following description of the politics plaguing the Navy up to World War I in The Rise of American Naval Power.[5]

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4. Robert Brent, Captain, U.S. Navy, "Mahan - Mariner or Misfit?," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 92, No. 4, April, 1966, pp. 93-103.

5. Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1775-1918, pp. 375-376.

> For reasons inherent in its structure and composition, Congress but rarely took a national view of naval defense. . . . the constitutional separation of powers raised serious obstacles against executive initiative and leadership. . . . To popularize the Navy in the different sections of the country, and to secure the congressional votes necessary to pass naval appropriations, it early became the established practice to distribute naval appointments, contracts, and other spoils as widely as possible. At best . . . naval development was correlated with international objectives in spite of patronage and the pork barrel. At worst, national interests and policies were lost to sight in a sordid congressional scramble for spoils. . . . Political strategy rather than naval strategy too often dictated the location of navy yards and other works. Oversea bases were chronically neglected, largely, it would appear, because the insular possessions had no congressional votes with which to bargain. Under such a system the American people might have the most expensive navy, but it was certain that they would never have as good a navy as the steadily rising financial outlay might have led them to expect.

Although the implementation of Mahan's strategic innovations was generally obstructed by political isolationists and economy drives, his writings had lasting influence on naval strategists up to World War II. Officer leadership in the Navy from Theodore Roosevelt's presidency through the doldrums of the 1920's and 1930's at least adhered to Mahan's ideals, although they were not given the forces to realize his doctrine.

Admiral Mahan's first and most influential book was The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published in Boston in 1890. In essence, Mahan's interpretation of history was imperialistic and mercantalistic. His book was based on the simultaneous rise of the

British Navy and the British Empire. To Mahan, expansion was the essence of national greatness, a concept shared by Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and their fellow precipitators of the Spanish-American War. To support expansion, a country must accumulate wealth, Mahan said, and a flourishing foreign commerce was the surest means. To compete successfully for markets, a nation must have a large and flourishing merchant marine, which in turn would contribute to the nation's wealth by carrying other nation's goods. To protect the merchant marine, the nation must have a strong navy to protect its merchant shipping and overseas colonies to provide safe havens abroad. The navy would protect the sea approaches to the mother country and the colonies, and the colonies in turn would provide bases and stations for the navy overseas.[6]

To effectively carry out his theory of national power through sea power, Mahan developed a fundamental principle: the doctrine of concentration of power. In its applied form this became the doctrine of battle-fleet supremacy. Mahan concluded that the greatest threat to American security would come from an enemy battle fleet threatening our shores; to insure safety of the country, the United States should maintain a fleet of capital ships, at least as strong as the strongest potential enemy. He recommended separate fleets for the Atlantic and Pacific, with the necessary bases and shipyards to

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6. Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power, pp. 9-10.

support them. Mahan singled out the national battle fleet as the ultimate form of power, and saw smaller or more diversified units as unnecessary except as they contributed to the survival of the battleship.[7]

Mahan's doctrines were eventually adopted by the United States Navy, although he was honored in his own service sometime after the enthusiastic reception his writings received in Europe. American naval officers came to see the Navy as the country's "first line of defense," and its primary mission as "command of the sea" through destruction of the enemy's fleet.[8]

Before the Navy could successfully implement their new strategic doctrine, a number of internal reforms were necessary that proved difficult to attain. The General Board, established in 1900, was to give the Secretary of the Navy professional advice in strategic planning. The Board had no control over the actual administration of the Navy, which was handled through the bureaus through World War II. President Theodore Roosevelt tried to centralize operational control of the service, but was generally unsuccessful. He did contrive to create the post of Aide for Operations to the Secretary, an advisor with no authority in the chain of command. Roosevelt did assert his powers as Commander in Chief in sending

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7. Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 63.

8. Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 112.

the "Great White Fleet" around the world in 1908, in the face of Congressional objection to the cost. Upon the return of the fleet, however, it was scattered to the various "home" naval yards and bases, where equipment repairs and naval payrolls could benefit local interests.[9]

During the Taft administration, the Navy's General Board supported a Council of National Defense, to coordinate military and naval policy and establish clear national policy for both. The Council was to consist of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the chairmen of the Senate and House Military and Naval Affairs Committees, the Army Chief of Staff, the Aide for Operations, and the Presidents of the Army and Navy War Colleges. The Navy hoped the Council would provide long range policy guidance for naval policy to originate in the Navy; the Army saw the Council as a means for central administrative power to make possible the reorganization of the Army for optimum efficiency. In truth, the Navy was opposed to concentrating the decision-making for military policy in the hands of the Executive, and looked to Congress for the exercise of civilian control over the military.[10] Disagreement between the Army and the Navy over the function of the Council, and resistance within the services, resulted in the failure of the proposal to get anywhere with Congress. Reformers in the Navy

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9. Hammond, Organizing for Defense, p. 65.

10. Ibid., pp. 64-71.

were finally able to get the post of Chief of Naval Operations established in the chain of command, "who, under the direction of the Secretary of Navy, shall be responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war and be charged with its general direction."[11] The Navy had hoped the CNO would provide direct access to Congress, by-passing the Secretary. During the period between the wars the responsibility and authority of the Chief of Naval Operations increased, to culminate in Admiral Ernest J. King's broad concept of the office in World War II.

The General Board repeatedly recommended increases in the size of the fleet from 1903. These recommendations were drastically reduced by a Congress unconcerned with Mahan's doctrine. During the first two years of President Wilson's administration the Navy continued to grow slowly, until the "preparedness" campaign of 1915, when President Wilson seemingly changed his mind after the Lusitania crisis in February.[12] Wilson was able to overcome strong congressional opposition from proponents of a "little navy" and on August 29, 1916, signed the Naval Act of 1916 which carried through the General Board's recommendations, and the service's desires for "a Navy second to none."[13]

In adopting Mahan's theories, the Navy possessed an established body of thought it could draw on to justify its annual budget requests

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11. Ibid., p. 72.

12. Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1775-1918, pp. 328-329.

13. Ibid., pp. 339-340.

before congress. In those periods in the 1920's and 1930's when no enemy was clearly apparent, the Mahan doctrine provided the basis for naval strength to meet a conceivable enemy -- any nation with a fleet that might threaten the security of the United States or its overseas possessions. Additionally, the Mahan doctrine met three prerequisites that any strategic theory has needed in this century if it was to get congressional support: first, the promise to meet and defeat any enemy at a point well removed from the continental United States; second, the promise to do this decisively and quickly; third, the promise to do it with technological superiority rather than with ground troops.[14] The strategic bombing strategies of the United States Air Force presumably met these criteria after World War II, offering the most protection for the money spent.

However, Mahan proved no match for the neutralist, isolationist, and pacifist sentiments that flourished after World War I. The American people had won "the war to end all wars," and were not inclined to support an effective military force thereafter. Defense spending sharply declined, and would not substantially increase until 1940. Reduced defense budgets had three main consequences for the Navy. First, hard priorities had to be established for ships and equipment, including decisions on how much money to spend on such innovations as aircraft and submarines. Second, the professional

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14. Davis, The Admirals Lobby, p. 113.

officer corps suffered a drop in morale as they were denied the means to support American commitments abroad, particularly in the Pacific. Finally, limited appropriations forced military leaders to compete bitterly for the funds available.[15] Vincent Davis believes that there was strong competition between the Army and the Navy for appropriations; it is more accurate to say that each service carried out an independent struggle with Congress and its respective service secretary, as the missions of the two services were believed to be virtually independent. Although the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were fairly considerate and sympathetic toward the navy's requests, those officers charged with naval policy and development felt that they only requested what was necessary to maintain the fleet and that any reductions were unwarranted. In the 1930's Admiral Harry E. Yarnell answered a congressional query of an appropriation item by saying bluntly: "Why the hell would we put it in there if we didn't need it?"[16]

If budgets were not a cause of inter-service rivalry, the innovation of the airplane certainly was. Although the Army Air Service played only a limited role in World War I, Army pilots already had visions of "air power" as the ultimate in modern warfare.

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15. Ibid., pp. 73-74.

16. Andrew G. Nelson, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy, "Politics and the Naval Officer," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 87, No. 9, September, 1961, p. 32.

By 1919 Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell and his followers were calling for autonomy for the air service, separate from the Army. General Mitchell wanted the air service to control all military aviation, including naval aviation. Mitchell charged that the "battleship admirals" would never allow any real progress in naval aviation, and that in any case the airplane had rendered all surface forces obsolete.[17] The General may have been correct on his first point, but could not foresee the quantum jump in carrier-based air power that developed in World War II. Most naval officers also lacked this foresight.

Mitchell carried out a concentrated public relations campaign beginning in 1919 with appearances before the LaGuardia Subcommittee of the House Committee on Military Affairs. Representative Fiorello La Guardia of New York was an early Congressional proponent of air power. Nothing resulted from these hearings but they set the stage for repeated congressional committee meetings and administrative commissions that would study air power over the next twenty years. According to Walter Millis: "In the two decades after 1919 there was hardly a year in which some board or Congressional committee was not sitting or reporting on the dilemma of air policy."[18] Mitchell's

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17. Archibald B. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 176-178.

18. Walter Millis, Arms and Men, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1956), p. 230.

efforts eventually resulted in the Air Corps Act of 1926, which enhanced the position of the Air Corps in the Army, and authorized a five-year expansion program. The creation of General Headquarters Air Force in 1935 gave the Air Force virtual autonomy.

The Navy's approach to aviation was relatively low-key. The army had taken initial cognizance of the possible military applications of air power, but the Navy was too much concerned with the building of the battle fleet to be overly concerned. General Mitchell's campaign to control all of military air did precipitate some action by the Navy, resulting in the forming of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921 and the commissioning of the first aircraft -- USS LANGLEY, a converted collier -- in 1922. Naval aviation continued to grow during the next two decades, and new applications of aviation to sea power would be developed. Nonetheless, it was not until Pearl Harbor in 1941 that the Navy fully realized the possibilities of carrier-launched air power. World War II was to prove the worth of carrier aviation as the main striking arm of the fleet, and the final demise of the battleship as ultimate in naval power.

The running controversy over military aviation was renewed after World War II. This question, nominally an interservice argument over the control of airpower, is part of the larger issue of military unification which emerged shortly after the Spanish-American War. The first proposals for military unification came from reformers demanding increased efficiency and economy in government operations.

The military was used as an example of lack of coordination of planning and effort. The unification drive abated somewhat until after World War I, when Congress considered a number of unification bills between 1921 and 1926. The revival of the unification controversy stemmed primarily from Mitchell's campaign for a separate air force. Both the Army and the Navy strongly and successfully fought broad reorganization of the services, fearing loss of identity and rejecting the theory that military forces fulfill similar functions. In spite of a spate of Congressional hearings, proponents of military unification could not interest enough congressmen in military reorganization during the boom-bust period between the World Wars, and the unification question would be dormant until late in World War II.

Low budgets and a battleship oriented strategy were two factors inhibiting the Navy's development during the interwar period, but they were only smaller parts of the overall American attitude toward foreign policy. George F. Kennan wrote in American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 that American diplomacy over these years was characterized by a self-righteous and "unshakeable belief that, if our principles were commendable, their consequences could not be other than happy and acceptable. But rarely could we be lured into a discussion of the real quantities involved. . . ."[19] The Washington Naval

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19. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: New American Library "Mentor" paperback, 1960), p. 45.

Conference of 1922 was popularly hailed as a great step toward disarmament and world peace, as was the ineffective Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which made war "illegal." These trends put the military in an outrageously ambiguous position -- military officers found themselves in existence for a purpose that the entire thrust of U.S. foreign policy has typically disavowed.[20] More precisely, the a priori rejection of the use of force resulted in an almost complete exclusion of the military departments, their civilian and uniformed heads alike, from the formulation of national policy during the 1930's.[21]

This unfortunate circumstance developed in spite of the lessons learned during World War I of the importance of coordinating military planning with foreign policy.[22] In fact, the services did not learn to effectively coordinate plans and policies until World War II made cooperation essential for survival. Both services looked to the State Department for foreign policy guidance which was not forthcoming. Franklin Roosevelt eventually solved the dilemma by acting as his own Secretaries of State, War and Navy, dealing directly

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20. Davis, The Admiral's Lobby, p. 144.

21. Walter Millis, with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 20.

22. Louis Morton, "Interservice Co-operation and Political-Military Collaboration," Total War and Cold War, Harry L. Coles, ed. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962), p. 142.

with the military heads of the services in prosecuting World War II.

Toward the end of the war, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal appraised the untenable situation of the military in peacetime, as the country refused to face the realities of international politics. Much the same temper was apparent in the 1930's. He sent friends copies of Kipling's "Tommy Atkins" on the soldier's lot in peace:[23]

> For it's Tommy this, and Tommy that, an' "chuck him out, the brute!"
> But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot.

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23. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 100.

CHAPTER IV

UNIFICATION AND STRATEGY

The United States Navy has had to deal with a series of critical problems since World War II, most of which grew out of the move toward unification of the services. The unification controversy was basically one of interservice relations and defense organization, but it included broad questions concerning the roles and missions of the services, selection of strategic weapons systems and the allocation of funds.

In the organization issue, the Army Air Force wanted independence of and equality with the other two services; the Army backed the Air Force and wanted centralized control of all three services; the Navy and the Marine Corps feared subordination or elimination. The unification problem was partially solved by the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments, and the allocation of roles and missions at the Key West and Newport Conferences in 1948 reassured the sea services of their future importance. As far as strategic roles were concerned, each service felt it had to justify its existence in terms of a general war with the Soviet Union. The Air Force opted whole-heartedly for strategic air power, while the Army and the Navy

called for "balanced forces."[1]

The interservice rivalry that grew from the unification question caused each service to publicly define and articulate its goals. The Air Force first asked for 70 bomber groups, which was approved by Congress but refused by the Executive. The Army based its plans on universal military training, long a devisive issue in the country. The Navy, rejecting Mahan, concentrated on naval air power and the requisite large carriers, plus enough diversification in the fleet to meet any conceivable level of threat.

For the purposes of this paper, the unification and strategy issues will be treated in a roughly chronological sequence emphasizing the Navy's relations with Congress. The discussion will begin with the first formal hearings on unification in 1944, and will be carried through to Secretary Robert S. McNamara's arrival at the Pentagon. Mr. McNamara's term in office is in itself a watershed in American military policy.

Pressure for unification, and the Navy-Air Force battle over aviation policy were not results of World War II; the seeds had been sowed in the period between the wars, and much of the resulting distrust was reaped in the late 1940's. The Army Air Service had begun its campaign for independence as far back as 1919. The "ground" Army opposed fragmentation of its service, and generally supported

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1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 372-374.

the Navy's opposition to unification during the next two decades. During World War II the Army under General George C. Marshall began to change its mind, and supported the Air Force concept of three services unified at the top.[2] Both the Army and the Navy began to plan for their versions of post-war organization in 1943, with little or no contact between the two services. An unofficial staff study originated in the War Department General Staff in early 1943, entitled "A Single Department of War in the Post-war Period," and was endorsed by General Marshall. This paper led to the Woodrum Committee hearings in 1944, the first formal confrontation between the services over unification.[3]

One particular event in 1943 foreshadowed the pending service clash, and illustrates one of the fundamental differences between the Navy and Air Force approaches to organizational issues. In May, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, established the Tenth Fleet to carry out anti-submarine warfare operations in the Atlantic. As certain Army Air Force squadrons engaged in anti-submarine warfare were operating in a somewhat confused state with the Tenth Fleet, Admiral King proposed that these Army units be put under operational control of appropriate Sea Frontier commanders or

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2. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp. 48-51.

3. Ibid., pp. 52-53.

special task forces to coordinate operations. The Army replied with a suggestion that the Army Air Force take over all land-based air under a Coastal Air Command, to be employed as an autonomous force.

The issue was finally settled by the Army agreeing to withdraw completely from anti-submarine warfare, after transferring certain of its specially-equipped B-24 aircraft to the Navy. The Navy in turn would permit the Army to draw Navy replacement B-24's. General Marshall wanted Admiral King to promise that the Navy would not use its B-24's to infringe on the Army Air Force's long-range bombing mission.

This instance clearly illustrated what was to be a major obstacle to unification. The Navy felt function should be the basis for organization, and the Army was convinced the weapon should determine organization. In the Navy concept, services should be assigned basic functions and given the bases and weapons to fulfill these functions regardless of whether the weapons operated on land, sea, or in the air. The Army approach was that the Air Force should control and operate all aircraft, that the Navy should control and operate all ships, and that the Army should be responsible for all ground action.[4]

A number of factors made it quite evident even during the war

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4. Ernest J. King, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Navy Record (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1952), pp. 462-470.

that the Navy and the Air Force would clash on unification. Both were concerned about post-war roles in national defense policy: naval officers saw the increasing popularity and political power of the Air Force as threatening the Navy's role in national defense policy; Air Force supporters saw strategic air power as the wave of the future, if not the present, and were determined that the Air Force should receive proper recognition and influence in the nation's military structure. To attain this the Air Force espoused defense unification, autonomy for the Air Force, a single military Chief of Staff, and a 70-group strategic bomber force.

To the Navy, unification and a single Chief of Staff would mean, under the circumstances of the time, that the Chief would almost certainly be an air general committed to the air power theory of warfare. The ground army, which no longer had any aviation of its own, was willing to accept this. The Navy, with its large investment in air power, feared appropriation of its airplanes by the Air Force and its Marine Corps divisions by the Army.[5]

World War II colored the battle to a great extent, as the services experienced frequent problems in operating jointly on a strategic scale. It was realized by all services that some sort of reorganization was necessary to give formal, legal status to the improvisations effected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war.

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5. Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: Capricorn Books, 1956), pp. 311-312.

Toward the end of the war, the Navy became concerned by the Army's attitude toward unity of command. As soon as the Navy's cooperation in Europe was no longer necessary, the Army rejected the principle of unity of command if it could not appoint and control the commander. In addition, the Navy began to suspect that one of the chief goals of the Army's unification plans was the weakening of the Navy's position in the appropriations process, and that the goal of some of the War Department's more extreme elements was virtual destruction of the Navy.[6]

Before World War II, service political controversy involved each service struggling independently against civilian isolationists, pacifists and economizers. The legislation concerning the two services was handled by separate House and Senate Committees, and separate appropriations subcommittees. After the War the futures of the services were interdependent. The prospect of a unified defense organization meant competition over organizational position and strategic doctrine and unified appropriations bills meant a decided increase in competition for funds.[7]

In the long run, some good came from the competition. Professor Huntington writes: "interservice rivalry, by challenging the services, also toughened them and forced them to develop the

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6. Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 92-93.

7. Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 370-371.

mechanisms and support necessary for survival in the pluralistic world of American politics. . . .Interservice competition thus tended to promote the continued existence of the services themselves."[8]

The zeal of the Army aviators and their self-identification as a new breed of military technologists, as well as their use of publicity stunts, provoked a strong reaction in the Navy's officer corps. Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, the first Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, wrote to a friend concerning General Mitchell's attacks on the Navy's approach to aviation: "As you know, to the average Naval officer the word "publicity" is anathema. I was brought up to hate it myself, and still hate it."[9] This traditional dislike for publicity was coupled with the naval aviators' stronger affection for their service than for their aviation units. The crusading Army aviators had, in the Navy's view, behaved in a manner most unsuitable to officers and their search for political favor and publicity was shameless. As a result, the Navy was forced to partially abandon its traditional distaste for politics and join the battle.

As the issues in the unification controversy clarified, the Navy never denied the right of the Air Force to independence; the Navy was primarily opposed to centralized power at the top of a unified defense

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8. Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," Total War and Cold War, Harry L. Coles, ed. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962), p. 205.

9. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946, pp. 44-47.

organization, and most particularly to a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Throughout the unification proceedings, the Navy stressed the extent to which centralized executive authority would diminish congressional influence.[10] The Navy insisted on individual service autonomy and detailed specification of the services' combatant functions, to protect naval aviation and the Marine Corps from domination by the other services.

Naval officers wanted to maintain a strong Navy with the World War II functions of naval aviation and Marines unimpaired. Too much centralized control would, they feared, result in a loss of combat effectiveness. Finally, the Navy was not favorably disposed to any change which might distort the favorable relations they had enjoyed with the President and particularly with Congress by introducing a new level of control.[11]

In March, 1944, Congress became involved in the unification question for the first time. Representative James W. Wadsworth introduced a resolution calling for the creation of a "Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy" to consist of seven members each from the House Military and Naval Affairs Committees, and nine Congressmen who were members of neither. The resolution directed "the Committee, acting as whole or by subcommittee, to investigate all

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10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957), p. 422.

11. Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, p. 108.

matters relating to the post-war military requirements of the United States."[12] Representative Clifton A. Woodrum of Virginia was named as chairman.

The first matter to be discussed when the hearings opened on April 24 was the organization of the military services into a single department, to include a separate air force. Although the chairman explained that the committee was simply a committee of inquiry and not of legislation, the War Department representatives requested general congressional approval of its unification plan "in principle," postponing detailed legislation until after the war. The War Department's plan was to create a single executive department, with a single military chief of staff under the civilian secretary of the department, but over all of the services. The Army claimed that unified armed forces would eliminate "waste and duplication," would guarantee more comprehensive and more adequate planning, and would result in better teamwork in war. This would assure more co-ordination between military and foreign policy, and would provide one comprehensive military budget for Congress to consider.[13]

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12. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces, hearings before the Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: G.P.O., 1944) Hereinafter referred to as Woodrum Committee Hearings, p. 1.

13. Ibid., pp. 5-119.

The Navy's case was lead by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who had announced that he was "not prepared to say that the Navy believes that the consolidation into one department is desirable."[14] The force of the Navy's argument was that no decision of any kind on unification would be taken until the war was over, its lessons digested, and the combat theater commanders heard from.[15] Navy Secretary Frank Knox died on April 28, the same day the first Navy Department witnesses were heard. Knox had supported the War Department's proposal and his support, according to Paul Hammond, induced Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, against his better judgment, to open his department's unification campaign before the Woodrum Committee.[16] The loss of Knox definitely hindered acceptance of the War Department proposals.

Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, aided the Navy's case considerably by careful probing into the logic of the War Department's proposal. He asked how they could propose combining two services into one unified department on the one hand, while at the same time wanting to create three

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14. Walter Millis, with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 146.

15. Woodrum Committee Hearings, p. 134.

16. Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 190-191.

services in the place of two which would defeat any increased efficiency gained by unification.[17] The committee soon realized that a deep split existed between the two services, and agreed to postpone the hearings indefinitely. No recommendation was forthcoming from the Woodrum Committee on unification.

The next phase in the unification controversy was the study and report made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee on Reorganization, a group set up by the Joint Chiefs in May headed by Admiral J. O. Richardson. The committee was supposed to include two Navy and two Army officers, but the War Department succeeded in adding a fifth "alternate" member, who took an active part in the study. The Richardson Committee interviewed 56 top military commanders in the field to determine their views on post-war military reorganization.

The committee found the great majority of Army officers and about half the Navy officers in favor of some sort of single department for the Armed Forces.[18] The committee submitted its report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 11, 1945, with all the members but Admiral Richardson in agreement. The committee recommended a single Department of the Armed Forces, with a civilian head of the department, a military head who would be Chief of Staff to the President

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17. Woodrum Committee Hearings, pp. 54-63.

18. Hammond, Organizing for Defense, p. 197.

and Commander of the Armed Forces under the Secretary, a United States Chiefs of Staff organization to advise the President on military matters, an independent Air Force and an Under Secretary to run the business side of the department.[19]

Secretary Forrestal was pessimistic as early as September, 1944, while the committee was still conducting interviews. He wrote to a friend: "I have been telling King, Nimitz and Company it's my judgment that as of today the Navy has lost its case, and that either in Congress or in a public poll the Army's point of view would prevail."[20] Paul Hammond believes the Navy commanders in the Pacific, far removed from the Washington battleground, did not understand the import of the unification struggle, and confused "unification of the armed forces" with "unity of command." These senior naval officers defined unity of command as a structure that would enable the Joint Chiefs to execute military policy without "political" interference, subject to control only from the President.[21]

In May, Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, suggested to Forrestal that a modified unification plan might be in order. Forrestal told Walsh "the Navy Department

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19. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

20. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 60.

21. Hammond, Organizing for Defense, pp. 201-203.

cannot be in the position of merely taking the negative in this discussion, but must come up with positive and constructive recommendations."[22] Accordingly, Forrestal asked an old friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to make a thorough study of current unification proposals. Eberstadt was asked to determine if unification of the services under a single head would improve national security; if not, what changes in the military organization have been indicated as necessary by the country's war experience; what governmental organization should be prescribed to enable the military and other government departments and agencies to most effectively provide for national security.[23]

In June, 1945, Secretary Forrestal sent the Navy's proposed personnel strength plan to the President, and announced the service's overall postwar plans to a joint session of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees. The committees' chairmen, Senator Walsh and Congressman Vinson, called the special session to provide the Navy with a congressional forum. Forrestal again led Navy efforts to avoid being overshadowed by the Air Force and the Army. Forrestal's remarks to the joint session outlined the country's need for sea power, however powerful the land and air services might be. He called for retention of balanced forces in the Navy, and stressed that the Navy

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22. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 61.

23. Ibid., p. 63.

did not seek world-wide naval superiority, but only on the sea approaches to the United States and its possessions.[24]

Congressman Vinson said the Navy's plans were too conservative, and subsequently scheduled hearings in his House committee, to open in September. In the interim, Forrestal talked to President Truman about post-war military organization. The President was in favor of a single Department of Defense, according to Forrestal, who told Truman he had "great reservations about the practical possibility of any one man running a show as big, even in peacetime, as the combined Army, Navy and Air Force."[25]

In September, Vinson opened hearings on House Concurrent Resolution 80, entitled "Composition of the Postwar Navy," to advance the Navy's case without submitting detailed legislation. The chief witnesses were Secretary Forrestal, Admiral King, and Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. They emphasized the continuing need for a strong Navy, regardless of the types of weapons developed. Witnesses pointed out that attacks on the United States required crossing the sea, and that the country's major enemies in the last two wars failed to control the seas and were defeated. Finally and perhaps most important, they inferred that the Navy regarded carrier-based air as the striking arm of the

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24. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946, pp. 157-160.

25. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 88-89.

fleet.[26] In this context, Forrestal said that the atomic bomb was "still a bomb, requiring land- or carrier-based planes to deliver it."[27] More explicitly, the Secretary said, "the control of the sea and of the air above it is the mission of the United States Navy--and the Navy will continue to discharge that mission with whatever weapons are the most effective."[28]

Vinson took his resolution from committee to the House, emphasizing the role of air power and aircraft carriers in the postwar Navy.[29] The resolution passed the House by a unanimous vote, recommending a balanced fleet, centered around ten active heavy carriers and the required support ships.[30] The Senate took no further action on the House resolution.

In mid-October 1945 the Senate Military Affairs Committee opened hearings on unification. Until now, the Navy had appeared to be recalcitrant, opposing an efficient and economical modernization

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26. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Naval Affairs, Composition of the Postwar Navy, hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs on House Concurrent Resolution 80, bound as Item No. 110 in a single volume entitled Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval Establishment 1945, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, G.P.O., 1945), pp. 1164-1165.

27. Ibid., p. 1165.

28. Ibid.

29. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st sess. pp. 1053, 1056.

30. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946, p. 202.

of the military for reasons of petty ambition or prestige.[31] Then on October 22, Forrestal introduced the Eberstadt Report on unification.

Eberstadt proposed three coordinate services, each headed by a secretary with a Secretary of Defense to supervise all three. He recommended the Joint Chiefs of Staff be made a statutory body, stressing unified operational command of the armed forces. For the larger problem of strategic planning and resource allocation, Eberstadt recommended a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, a National Security Resources Board, a Central Research and Development Agency and a Military Education and Training Board.[32] The National Security Council would link the State Department to the three military services and coordinate all four. The other agencies would correlate military planning with economic, intelligence and production planning.

Within eight days, the Army submitted its plan, referred to as the "Collins Plan" after the primary drafter, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins. The Collins Plan called for a single Department of Defense, a single Secretary, and a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces who would be not only advisor but "executive" for the Secretary. The Air Force was to be separate and co-equal, and would

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31. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 152-153.

32. Hammond, Organizing for Defense, pp. 152-153.

control all land-based combat aviation.[33] The two plans and the ensuing debate reiterated the fundamental difference between the organizational philosophies of the two services. The Navy intended to maintain the service departments as the predominant elements in the military establishment, with operational control passing from the President through the Joint Chiefs. The Army's general staff concept would put maximum power in the hands of the "Secretary of National Defense" and his Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

In the midst of these organizational debates, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, made his last report to the President in November, 1945:[34]

> In any future war the Air Force, being unique among the armed services in its ability to reach any possible enemy without long delay, will undoubtedly be the first to engage the enemy and, if this is done early enough, it may remove the necessity for extended surface conflict. It is entirely possible that the progressive development of the air arm . . . will reduce the requirement for or employment of mass armies and navies. . . . The Strategic theory, as applied to the United States Air Warfare concept, postulates that air attack on internal enemy vitals can so deplete specific industrial and economic resources, and on occasion the will to resist, as to make continued resistance by the enemy impossible . . . .

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33. Millis, Arms and the State, p. 154.

34. Walter Millis, ed., American Military Thought (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., for the American Heritage Series, 1966), pp. 445-458.

Arnold added that an efficient Air Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but without it there could be no national security. He did say that "it is the team of the Army, Navy and Air Forces working in close cooperation that gives strength to our armed services in peace or war,"[35] but concluded by calling for "ruthless elimination of all arms, branches, services, weapons, equipment or ideas whose retention might be indicated only by tradition, sentiment or sheer inertia."[36]

General Arnold's statement confirmed three long-standing Navy suspicions: the Air Force claimed predominance in the nation's military strategic planning; the Air Force fully intended to absorb as much of the Navy's air capability as possible; and the Air Force did not anticipate any strategic role at all for either the Navy or the Army. Finally, Arnold's remarks about "ruthless elimination" of branches whose retention might be indicated by tradition or sentiment infuriated the Marine Corps.

On December 19, 1945, President Truman sent a unification message to Congress, accepting the Eberstadt recommendations on higher organization to mesh military planning and foreign policy, and co-ordination of the military, economic and political aspects

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35. Ibid., p. 449.

36. Ibid., p. 458.

of national security. The President supported the Collins Plan for the organization of the Defense Department and the single Chief of Staff. Senator Elbert D. Thomas, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, began working on an administration-sponsored unification bill. Thomas' committee reported the bill out in mid-April 1946.

The Thomas Bill maintained the Chief of Staff as principal advisor to the Secretary of National Defense, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff would maintain their position as principal military advisors to the President. The Navy opposed the Thomas proposals vehemently, and both services were vociferous in their public lobbying before the bill was reported. On April 11, the President rapped the Navy for opposing what was essentially an administration proposal.[37]

In May, the President called together the Secretaries of War and the Navy and told them to settle their differences. Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's top military advisor, explained his reasons for opposing a single chief of staff. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson admitted he was not prepared to "jump into the ditch and die" for the idea. The President said he was primarily interested in unification, and a single Chief of Staff was "too much along the lines of the 'man on horseback' philosophy." Truman implied that the Marine Corps and naval aviation need not be concerned

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37. Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 151.

about absorption by the Army and the Air Force.[38] Finally, the President said he intended to have "ceilings" for defense costs, which would cause considerable problems in 1948 with the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade.

Two problems remained to be solved between the services: the role of the new Secretary of Defense, and the roles and missions of the armed forces. The Navy desired to restrict the Secretary to the role of "coordinator," and the Army wanted strong control at the top. The President announced in June that he supported a single Department of National Defense under a Secretary of Cabinet rank, with the three service secretaries subordinate. The Navy would maintain the Marine Corps as a combat force, but land-based reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft would go to the Air Force.

Little was done in the remainder of 1946 on unification. In fact, the Navy-Air Force disagreements were acerbated when the President approved Air Force participation in the Navy's atomic test series at Bikini. The Navy was unable to conduct a number of the tests it had planned, and the scientific usefulness of the first test was virtually destroyed when the Air Force insisted it needed practice in dropping bombs from aircraft instead of detonating the weapon from an anchored balloon. The bomb missed the target by two miles, damaging many of

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38. Millis, Arms and the State, p. 171.

the data-gathering instruments. The Air Force announced publicly that the extensive damage to test ships proved ships were intolerantly vulnerable in the atomic age; the Navy hotly denied this and said the ships were obsolete, anchored, unmanned and closely grouped in confined waters, which would not be the case in fleet operations.[39]

In another pertinent development, the House and the Senate in 1946 combined their Military and Naval Affairs Committees, to provide for a single Committee on the Armed Services in each chamber, anticipating eventual unification of the services under one cabinet post.

On January 16, 1947, the White House released a statement signed by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, announcing agreement between the services on the proposed military organization. The recommendations called for a single Secretary of Defense with coordinating powers, a National Security Council, a War Council, a National Security Resources Board, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a command structure headed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[40] The problem of the roles and missions for the services was to be decided by executive order rather than law, and the two Secretaries drafted a proposal giving the Marine Corps primary responsibility for amphibious warfare and the Navy primary responsibility for its own

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39. Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943-1946, pp. 244-246.

40. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services), Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services on Senate Resolution 758, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G.P.O., 1947), pp. 2-3.

land-based reconnaissance and patrol aircraft.

Hearings on the administration's unification proposal began in March, 1947, and the Congress slowly worked out what would be the National Security Act of 1947. The hearings were highlighted by Congressional references to the "browbeating" of military witnesses by their civilian superiors,[41] and some highly-charged testimony by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the president of the Marine Corps Reserve Association highlighted the hearings. The Marines were still concerned about their future in the "unified armed forces," and wanted their place in the national military structure confirmed definitely by statute and not by executive order.[42]

Public response to the hearings was generally favorable, except for the time it had taken since the end of the war to arrive at a national defense organization to face the uncertainties of the post-war era. The National Security Act was finally voted through Congress, and signed by the President in July.

The Keystone of the new system was the National Security Council, designed to generate basic policy recommendations in all matters affecting national security. The President was named chairman of the body, and the members included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the three service Secretaries, the chairman

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41. Ibid., pp. 395-397.

42. Ibid., pp. 411-414.

of the National Security Resources Board, and anyone the President might choose to add from time to time. The Central Intelligence Agency was placed directly under the Council.

The "Military establishment" was composed of three Departments, administered by a civilian Secretary and sustaining a military service under the command of its Chief of Staff, or Chief of Naval Operations. Common military direction was provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the military heads of the services, and supported by the Joint Staff. The Secretary of Defense had limited authority, but did have potential power in his responsibility to supervise and coordinate budget estimates.

The two military aspects of unification that had most troubled the Navy - naval aviation and the Marine Corps - were provided for by Congress in the law. Naval aviation was integrated with the naval service as part of the Department of the Navy. The Navy was made generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The Marine Corps was designated to consist of the Fleet Marine Force of combined arms, plus air, for service with the fleet in the seizure of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential for the prosecution of a naval campaign.[43]

The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 was

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43. Millis, ed., American Military Thought, pp. 471-472.

designed mainly to clarify and enhance the authority of the Secretary of Defense. James Forrestal, the first Secretary, recommended most of the changes in 1948 after a year in office.[44] The Secretary was given "direction, authority and control" over the military, the qualifying word "general" being removed from the original act. The service departments lost their status as executive departments to become "military" departments, and lost their secretaries' membership on the National Security Council. A non-voting chairman was added to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the number of officers on the Joint Staff was increased from 100 to 210. Finally, the Secretary of Defense was given a Deputy Secretary and three Assistant Secretaries to enable him to discharge his increased responsibilities. A Comptroller was authorized for the Department of Defense, and to each of the three military departments, increasing the Secretary's control over military budgets.[45]

One very important element of the unification question and Navy-Air Force antipathy was the atomic bomb. In August 1945 neither service was prepared to realize the implications of the weapon, but the Air Force seized on atomic bombs first, as a natural extension of their strategic bombing doctrine. General Arnold said in his message

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44. Arnold A. Rogow, James Forrestal (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), pp. 304-305.

45. Ibid.

to the President in November, 1945:[46]

> The influence of atomic energy on air power can be stated very simply. It has made air power all-important. Air power provides not only the best present means of striking an enemy with atomic bombs, but also the best protection against the misuse of atomic explosives.

Arnold added that the Air Forces were the recognized masters of strategic bombing, and "the atomic weapon . . . makes offensive and defensive Air Power in a state of immediate readiness the primary requisite of national survival."[47]

Initially, no one in the military could publicly talk as if the atomic bomb formed a part of the country's military-diplomatic arsenal, as the Baruch Plan was being urged on the United Nations to prevent the use of such weapons. The Air Force, however, made extensive plans for including atomic bombs in its arsenal, and claimed exclusive rights for their use.

In 1947, President Truman appointed a commission under Thomas K. Finletter to report on air policy in the nuclear age. The resulting report was almost entirely oriented to the Air Force and paid little attention to naval aviation largely because the commission consulted almost exclusively with Air Force officers. However, as Walter Millis wrote, "there were many, not only in the Navy but

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46. Millis, ed., American Military Thought, p. 454.

47. Ibid., pp. 455-456.

outside it, who were not convinced that all strategic wisdom resided in the young generals of the Air Force."[48]

The commission concluded that the military establishment must be built around the air arm. "Of course," the report said, "an adequate Navy and Ground Force must be maintained. But it is the Air Force and naval aviation on which we must mainly rely. Our military security must be based on air power."[49] The commission said the United States must have an air arm in being capable of dealing with a possible atomic attack by January 1, 1953. This argument was exploited by the Air Force in its demands for a 70-group bomber force, never fully accepted by either the President or Congress. James Forrestal clung to the principle of "balance" in the country's military establishment, and had no desire to see military policy distorted into a primarily air power strategy. But to Congress and the public, the idea of "Air Power" was romantic and provided a simple, economic answer to the problems of national defense. Universal military training, essential to the Army's mobilization plans, began to pale as massive air power would do away with any need for it.

Forrestal had also been trying to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come to some agreement on the allocation of roles and missions of the services, beyond the perimeters of the National Security Act

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48. Millis, Arms and the State, p. 207.

49. Ibid., p. 205.

of 1947. From March 11 to 14, 1948, the Joint Chiefs conferred with Forrestal at Key West, Florida. The group agreed on three broad decisions:[50]

1. For planning purposes, the Marine Corps was to be limited to four divisions with the provision that the Marines were not to create "another land army."

2. The Air Force recognized the "right" of the Navy to proceed with the development of weapons the Navy considers essential to its function but with the proviso the Navy will not develop a separate strategic air force, this function being reserved to the Air Force.

3. The Air Force recognized the right and need for the Navy to participate in an all-out air campaign.

With an eye toward military preparedness, the Joint Chiefs decided it was necessary to ask for an immediate restoration of Selective Service in view of the worsening relations with the Soviet Union and the Czech coup.

The Chiefs also discussed the use of the atomic bomb and concluded that the Navy could not be denied the use of the weapon, as long as it was used against naval targets such as submarine bases. Forrestal had given the Navy permission to proceed with plans for its giant "flush-deck" aircraft carrier, designed to employ

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50. C. Joseph Bernado and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1955), p. 472.

the large aircraft necessary to carry the heavy atomic bombs of the time.

Since 1947 the Navy had worked on a project to prove that atomic weapons could be successfully deployed from carriers. While plans were being perfected for a jet aircraft designed specifically for atomic bombs, a special Navy project worked on techniques to launch and recover the Navy's 60,000 pound P2V aircraft from a carrier. The Navy felt the only way to convince Congress was to develop a weapons delivery system with equipment already on hand. The P2V, nominally an anti-submarine warfare land-based airplane, was the only Navy plane big enough to carry the large atomic bombs then in production, and barely small enough to operate from an aircraft carrier. By December, 1948, the Navy had a crude capability to deliver an atomic bomb from a regular operational carrier. Two special Composite Squadrons were formally commissioned with atomic bomb capability.

To prove the point Commander John T. Hayward took off in a P2V from the carrier MIDWAY with a select number of guests, including Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley. Hayward flew his group of

critical observers from MIDWAY to Washington.[51]

The Key West Conference did not completely resolve all differences on atomic weapons, and Secretary Forrestal called another conference for August, 1948, at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The first question concerned operational control of atomic weapons, which the Air Force said should be given to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was agreed the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, would report to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, giving operational control to the Air Force. In return the Air Force was obligated to utilize any strategic bombing capabilities the Navy might develop in planning and programming strategic bombing missions.[52]

By the end of 1948 the Navy had confirmed its capability to use atomic weapons and had received permission to build its "super carrier" to more effectively deploy the weapons in the fleet. The Navy no longer feared for the safety of the Marine Corps, and for the time being naval aviation seemed to be secure as the focal point of naval power. Most of this was due to the efforts of James Forrestal, who was responsible for mobilizing the service's efforts in the unification battle and for establishing naval aviation as the basis for modern naval strategic doctrine. This was accomplished with great difficulty

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51. Vincent Davis, "The Politics of Innovation," Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1966-67, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, pp. 13-17.

52. Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy, pp. 472-473.

because Congress was impressed with the Air Force's seemingly economical doctrine of strategic bombing with mass-destruction weapons.

Although the Navy seemed secure when Forrestal left the Pentagon in March, 1949, later that year the "B-36 controversy" reopened the bitter and viciously contested battle between the Navy and the Air Force. The battle began inobtrusively in March, 1948, when Forrestal recommended a supplementary defense budget to the President, in view of recent events in Europe. The Joint Chiefs agreed on a 70-group bomber force for the Air Force, a flush-deck "super carrier" for the Navy and universal military training for the Army. While Congress considered the military's requests, the Air Force launched a strong campaign for its bomber force, and inferred that the Navy's carrier had never been formally recommended by the Joint Chiefs. Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan and Admiral Louis E. Denfield, Chief of Naval Operations, were committed to Forrestal's moderate approach and did little to counter the Air Force claims. In passing the budget for fiscal year 1949, which began with July, 1948, Congress approved selective service, but not universal military training; it apportioned funds for the first year's increment of a five-year, 70-group Air Force program; and for the first year of

construction on the Navy's carrier.[53]

While Congress was considering the 1950 budget, the Air Force continued its publicity campaign, culminating in the "leak" of an Air Force presentation earmarking 70 strategic targets in the Soviet Union within range of B-36's on non-stop return flights from the North American continent. The Navy had attempted a publicity campaign of its own but could not match the Air Force's fabulous leak. Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and a long-time Navy supporter, reacted vehemently to this and other leaks. Vinson's committee passed unanimously a statement introduced by its Chairman:[54]

> The Armed Services Committee wants it clearly understood that if persons in the armed services or in their employ continue to pass statements to the press which are calculated to deprecate the activities of a sister service, and which, at the same time, jeopardize the national security, the committee will step in with a full-scale investigation.

In April, 1949, newly-appointed Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson recommended to the President that the Navy's flush-deck carrier be cancelled. Johnson had canvassed the Joint Chiefs, who

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53. Paul W. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," American Civil-Military Decisions, Harold Stein, ed. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp.478-482.

54. The New York Times, April 6, 1949, p. 1.

were two to one against construction of the ship. Navy Secretary Sullivan had not been consulted before Johnson made his announcement. Johnson stopped construction only five days after the keel had been laid, and according to one newspaper account, "abandonment of the project represented a victory for the Air Force which demanded sole responsibility for strategic bombing."[55]

Johnson, motivated by a desire to reduce military expenditures, selected B-36's carrying atomic bombs as the country's force in being. Johnson was attentive to the views of General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, Air Force Chief of Staff, who claimed the fundamental purpose of the super carrier duplicated Air Force strategic bombing efforts. Johnson agreed and ordered construction on the carrier stopped.[56]

Secretary Sullivan immediately prepared a letter of resignation which summarized the Navy's attitude at this time:[57]

> I am . . . very deeply disturbed by your action which so far as I know represents the first attempt ever made in this country to prevent the development of a power weapon. The conviction that this will result in a renewed

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55. Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy, p. 471.

56. Hammond, American Civil-Military Decisions, pp. 494-495.

57. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, The National Defense Program: Unification and Strategy, Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: G.P.O., 1950) Hereinafter referred to as Unification and Strategy Hearings, pp. 622-623.

> effort to abolish the Marine Corps and to transfer all naval and marine aviation elsewhere adds to my anxiety.
> However, even of greater significance is the unprecedented action on the part of a Secretary of Defense in so drastically and arbitrarily changing and restricting the operational plans of an armed service without consultation with that service. The consequences of such a procedure are far-reaching and can be tragic.

Congressman Vinson, the Navy's tried and true friend, applauded Johnson on the floor of the House for a "courageous act." Vinson had earlier opposed the carrier, believing that the 70-group Air Force would most benefit the nation's defense effort.[58]

Soon after the carrier cancellation, rumors began to circulate about the vulnerability of the B-36 to fighter aircraft. Both Navy and Air Force fighter pilots hinted that it could be shot down. In May, Representative James Van Zandt introduced a resolution before the House, calling for investigation of aircraft contracts, and hinting of irregularities in connection with procurement of B-36 aircraft. These leaks apparently originated with Cedric Worth, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy.[59]

Congressman Vinson scheduled hearings of a select committee of his House Armed Services Committee with himself as chairman to investigate Van Zandt's rumors, to examine the performance of the B-36 bomber, to examine the roles of the Air Force and naval

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58. Ibid.

59. Hammond, American Civil-Military Decisions, pp. 496-497.

aviation to see if the cancellation of the carrier was sound, and to investigate the role of the Air Force in strategic bombing and the overall effectiveness of strategic bombing in general.

The first phase of the B-36 hearings in August was devoted to Air Force testimony, presenting a good picture of the bomber. The Navy was to present testimony in October but in September Captain John G. Crommelin, a naval aviator, held an intemperate press conference at which he damned unification. In response, Secretary Matthews asked senior naval officers for their views on defense organization and naval aviation. Vice Admiral Gerald F. Bogan, Commander of the First Task Fleet of the Pacific Fleet, responded at length, expressing uneasiness with current Defense Department policies. Admiral Arthur A. Radford, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Denfield endorsed Admiral Bogan's sentiments by saying that they represented the feeling in the fleet.[60]

The Bogan correspondence was leaked to the press, and the resulting publicity caused Matthews to decide to replace Admiral Denfield as Chief of Naval Operations, although the Admiral had been approved by the Senate for a second two-year term. Ironically, most naval officers distrusted Admiral Denfield because of his alleged support for the B-36 before the Joint Chiefs. With somewhat more foundation, the officer corps felt Secretary Matthews did not adequately

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60. The New York Times, October 4, 1949, p. 1.

advocate Navy viewpoints.

Secretary Matthews was the first Navy witness. He attempted to blame the whole disturbance within the Navy on discontented aviators. Vinson rebutted Matthews' statement saying that the Navy's reaction was simply displeasure with severe cutting of naval forces.[61] The testimony of the naval officers was led by Admiral Radford, who called the B-36 a "bad gamble" with national security and criticized the tendency to over-emphasize strategic bombing.[62] Other witnesses attacked the performance of the bomber and claimed that Navy fighters could intercept it.

Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie related strategic bombing to national objectives: "War is an instrument of national policy; consequently the method of waging war must effectively support national policy. Military aims must be consonant with political aims. . . . The greatest defect of the present concept of strategic bombing . . . is its contradictory relation to fundamental ideals, policies, and commitments of the United States."[63] Additional testimony defended the concept of the flush-deck carrier and criticized the alleged economy of strategic bombing.

W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, gave the Air

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61. Unification and Strategy Hearings, pp. 8-9, 22.

62. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

63. Ibid., p. 185.

Force rebuttal. He accused the Navy of attacking the B-36 in order to push its own budgetary programs. General Omar N. Bradley attacked the Navy's attitude toward unification, saying that the "grievances of a few officers who will not accept the decisions of the authorities established by law . . . have done infinite harm to our national defense, our position of leadership in world affairs, the position of our national policy, and the confidence of the people in their government."[64]

The committee's report on the hearings did not support one service's views over the other. In fact, the report supported civilian control of the military and the importance of Congress in matters concerning national defense. The committee did not pass judgment on the B-36, but said the Air Force is the best judge of a weapon designed to carry out its mission. The committee "deplored" the manner of cancellation of the super carrier, but decided to withhold further action on the matter.[65]

In summary, the Navy lost part of its case, as cancellation orders on the carrier stood. However the Navy's primary concern had been pressing its claim for a stake in the strategic retaliatory mission. The House committee supported this saying the Air Force was not synonymous with the nation's military air power.

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64. Ibid., pp. 536-537.

65. Hammond, American Civil-Military Decisions, pp. 549-551.

The final conclusion to the B-36 controversy came with the Korean War. Air power was not a decisive factor in the war and Forrestal's doctrine of balanced forces was upheld. In any case, competing strategic theories were pushed aside in favor of immediate military strength; in the winter of 1950-1951 Congress quadrupled military appropriations from $15 billion to $60 billion. The Navy got funds to build more aircraft carriers and the Air Force began to push development of better jet bombers.

The Korean War and the subsequent development of thermo-nuclear weapons changed the strategic framework of the post-war period. The Air Force stressed the deterrent aspect of air power, and not its "decisive" aspect. The Army and the Navy developed the doctrine of limited war, in the nuclear context.[66] The Navy could argue that of all the services it had broadly diversified forces which could support one or more functional missions: strategic retaliation, defense of Europe, limited war, and defense of the North American continent. The Air Force was primarily suited for strategic deterrence, while the Army was equipped for the defense of Europe and limited war.[67]

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration brought a period of relative stability to the nation's military scene. The

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66. Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 409-410.

67. Ibid., pp. 423-424.

unification issue was quiescent, although the Air Force benefited most from Eisenhower's "New Look" which placed greater reliance on nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower's intention was to balance economy and stability with the needs of national strategy, and keep defense spending under control. The nuclear deterrent was predominant, and the military's limited-war capability was cut back. The Army suffered most from this doctrine, but the Navy faced determined Air Force opposition in building the new FORRESTAL class of attack carriers.

President Eisenhower sponsored some minor changes in defense organization in 1953 in an effort to establish one clear channel of command from the Secretary of Defense through the service secretaries. The Secretary was provided with six additional Assistant Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense was put in the chain of command from the President to the unified and specified commands, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff became a planning and advisory body, rather than a source of command.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was the final legislative step in post-war military reorganization and established the bounds in which Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara operated so effectively during his term in office. The 1958 act added to the Secretary's role, stating that the three service departments were separately organized" but functioned "under the direction, authority d control" of the Secretary. The unified and specified commands

were made directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs, but the Secretary remained in the chain of command. Most significantly, the Secretary was given the power to transfer, reassign, abolish and consolidate functions among the services. The Secretary was given complete discretion in assigning the development and operational use of new weapons or weapons systems to one or more of the services.[68] The responsibility for maintaining order in national security affairs now rested squarely on the Secretary of Defense.

The 1958 legislation profoundly affected the service secretaries. According to Eugene Zuchert, former secretary of the Air Force, whereas the service secretaries were previously "responsible for the 'conduct of military operations,' their responsibility was now reduced to the 'organization, training and equipment' of the forces to be employed by the unified commands."[69]

Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, previously Secretary of the Navy, began the shakeup at the Pentagon, but the potentials of the reorganization measures were not realized until the forceful personality of Robert McNamara appeared. President John F. Kennedy accelerated the trend in the military establishment toward integration of related functions, unified command structures and

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68. Burton M. Sapin, The Making of United States Foreign Policy, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 148-149.

69. Eugene M. Zuckert, "The Service Secretary: Has He A Useful Role?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 3, April, 1966, p. 462.

centralized decision-making powers in the hands of the Secretary of Defense.

Until McNamara, the military, traditionally resistant to change, either outlasted or out flanked previous civilian superiors who attempted to make major reforms by means other than osmatic. After the Secretary had been in office for some time, a Navy captain observed: "We who lamented idly the threat of the military man on horseback now face a new twist, the civilian on horseback."[70]

The military's initial response to McNamara was largely negative. The officers believed that the Secretary and his civilians didn't understand people. McNamara's managerial innovations were particularly unpopular. Top military officers in Washington were decidedly hostile to cost-benefit analysts, who often recommended against some prized weapons system of their own service. Officers found it incredible that "youngsters," many of them PhD.'s in economics, of all things, could have anything to contribute in the face of their own combat or military-command experience.[71]

Military attitudes have gradually changed over the past few years with the realization that much of the dislike for McNamara

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70. Paul R. Schratz, Captain, U.S. Navy, "The Ivy-Clad Man on Horseback," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91, No. 3, March, 1965, p. 43.

71. Stephen Enke, ed., Defense Management (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), p. vi.

was personal, and that his new techniques were sound, In fact, military officers trained in systems analysis have proven equally as proficient as their young civilian counterparts and the system is being extended beyond the Office of the Secretary of Defense throughout the individual services.

Besides increased efficiency, McNamara's methods have tempered interservice bickering. Programs, weapons and budgets cut across service lines, all tightly coordinated at the top in the Secretary's office. Such rivalry as exists is a product of pride in service, a great improvement.

CHAPTER V

BASES IN SPAIN

An outstanding example of Navy and Congressional influence on national policy was the defense agreement signed by the United States and Spain on September 26, 1953. Congress, through its legislative function, often participates at least passively in civil-military decisions, but virtually never sets a policy to be adopted by an administration. In this instance, Congressional leadership brought about a change in firm administration policy, avidly assisted by Navy and Air Force officers who successfully by-passed their civilian superiors in the Defense Department.

At the end of World War II, Franco's Spain was largely discredited in the eyes of the victorious allies, The San Francisco Conference in June 1945 adopted a resolution denying United Nations membership to "states whose regimes have waged war against the United Nations, so long as these regimes are in power."[1] At the Potsdam Conference in July, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed not to support a request by Spain for

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1. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47, Department of Public Information, United Nations (Lake Success, N. Y., 1947), pp. 20-21.

admission into the United Nations. On March 4, 1946, The United States, Great Britain and France expressed hope that "leading patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards" would bring about a "peaceful withdrawal" of Franco, and offered recognition and economic assistance to the movement that could accomplish this objective.[2]

In October 1946 the United States announced its policy toward Spain before the United Nations, stating opposition to Franco, willingness to take necessary action against Spain under the Charter should that country become "a threat to international peace and security" and expressed continued opposition to admission of the Franco regime to the United Nations and its international agencies.[3] In December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring Franco a "guilty party" with Hitler and Mussolini in World War II, and recommended that members of the United Nations immediately recall their ambassadors and ministers from Spain.[4]

Nonetheless, the position of Spain in European defense strategy was, according to Professor Ruhl J. Bartlett, "a special problem

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2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Document No. 123 (Washington G. P. O., 1950), p. 887.

3. Raymond Dennet and Robert K. Turner, Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VIII, 1945-1946, World Peace Foundation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 889-890.

4. Ibid., pp. 890-891.

for American foreign policy."[5] By 1948, the policy of the United States toward Spain began to change, in spite of President Truman's opposition to the Franco government.

The Navy's desire to maintain a fleet presence in the Mediterranean prompted interest in closer relations with Spain. In the summer of 1946, the Soviet Union, long covetous of the Dardanelles, tried to force Turkey to accept an agreement which would result in Soviet domination of the straits. Truman's advisors feared that successful Soviet demands on Turkey would be followed by infiltration and domination of Greece, and a threat to British communications with India.[6] Although no confrontation with the Soviets took place over Turkey in 1946, the Truman Doctrine and military aid to Greece and Turkey were announced the following year.

In August 1946 Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and naval advisor to the Secretary of State at the Paris Peace Conference, wrote Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that the presence of American naval forces in the Mediterranean would have a stabilizing influence in that part of the world.[7]

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5. Ruhl J. Bartlett, Policy and Power (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), pp. 254-255.

6. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 191-192.

7. Stephen G. Xydis, "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 84, No. 8, August, 1958, pp. 41-50.

Unfortunately, rapid demobilization and President Truman's desire for low defense costs threatened the effective presence of the United States Navy in European waters as well as in the Pacific. Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to discuss capabilities as well as commitments.

The Navy had been "showing the flag" in Mediterranean ports for almost a year, and the American forces were well received. On October 1, 1946, Secretary Forrestal announced the United States intended to maintain American units in the Mediterranean. Forrestal said units of the American fleet had been in the Mediterranean and would remain there to support American forces in Europe, to carry out American policy and diplomacy, and for purposes of experience, morale and education of personnel of the Fleet. The permanent commitment of U.S. naval forces in Europe was a "decisive new development of American policy," according to Walter Millis. Forrestal's announcement formally linked naval operations with foreign policy in the public mind, which had been his intention.[8]

The Soviet Union strongly objected to the American naval presence in their press, and these objections were echoed by the Communist Party press in Greece, Italy and France.[9] In spite of Soviet resentment, the Sixth Fleet has remained in the Mediterranean

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8. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 211.

9. Xydis, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August, 1958, pp. 48-49.

as strong evidence of American and NATO presence. However, maintenance of a credible presence requires base and logistic support, which led to Navy support of American military installations in Spain.

By 1948 it was clear that the Navy and the Air Force were still at loggerheads, in spite of the National Security Act of 1947. Although many of the organizational issues had been settled, the two services disagreed on the employment of atomic weapons. James Forrestal wrote in July that "the area of disagreement between the Air Force and Navy Air is not necessarily wide but it is quite deep." He felt the Navy still thought the Air Force wanted control of all aviation, and the Air Force believed that the Navy was trying to "encroach on the strategic air prerogatives of the Air Force."[10] The Air Force did not want defense funds spent on aircraft carriers or on overseas bases which might take money from strategic air power development.

The Navy was concerned about the lack of American-controlled bases near the western approaches to the Mediterranean. The British had bases at Gibralter, Yalta and Egypt, and the Navy feared British control of a Mediterranean fleet unless the United States established bases in the area.[11] Secretary Forrestal sympathized with the Navy's position, but was mainly concerned with President

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10. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 464-466.

11. Theodore J. Lowi, "Bases in Spain," American Civil-Military Decisions, Harold Stein, ed. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), p. 674.

Truman's insistence on a $15 billion budget ceiling for defense which the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted was too low.

The Navy's efforts toward better relations with Spain could not have succeeded without the so-called "Spanish Lobby." Franco was concerned that Spain would be the only Western European country not receiving aid from the United States. Charles Patrick Clark, an American, was engaged as a lobbyist on behalf of the Spanish government. Support for better relations with Spain eventually came from five groups: first, influential lay and clerical leaders of the Catholic Church, including Senator Pat McCarran; second, an anti-Communist group which considered Franco the strongest anti-Communist leader in Europe; third, the Navy group, including several Admirals and the Secretary of the Navy; fourth, an essentially Republican anti-Truman group, led by Senator Robert Taft; and finally, agricultural interests favoring credits to Spain for the purchase of American agricultural products.[12]

By 1949 the Navy was becoming increasingly concerned about acquiring base facilities near the Straits of Gibralter. Admiral Conolly had made repeated requests for permission to take fleet units into Spanish ports for courtesy visits since 1947; finally, in September, the President authorized a visit to El Ferrol, on the Atlantic side of Gibralter. American ships entered a Spanish port

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12. Ibid., p. 676.

on September 3 for the first time since the Spanish civil war, and remained for five days. Admiral Conolly called on General Franco at his nearby summer headquarters, accompanied by a number of Navy, Army and Air Force flag and general officers.[13] In October, before the House Armed Services Committee, the Admiral presented the Navy's case for bases in Spain. "The strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula is uniquely evident," he said. "The more friends you have on your flank the better."[14]

Admiral Forrest Sherman, appointed Chief of Naval Operations after Admiral Louis Denfield was removed, requested permission to include Spain in a tour of Europe, but was turned down. In the meantime, units of the Sixth Fleet paid a call to Barcelona, on the Mediterranean side of Gibralter. The Air Force became interested in Spain in 1949. Secretary Forrestal encouraged the Air Force to look beyond collaboration with the British in the establishment of strategic bases in Europe, as he feared overconcentration of American Forces in Britain could mean loss of access to the Middle East. Because of possible political ramifications, the Air Force initially passed over Spain and concentrated on North Africa, although potential support for the pro-Spanish elements remained.[15]

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13. The New York Times, September 4, 1949, p. 4.

14. Ibid., October 13, 1949, p. 1.

15. Lowi, American Civil-Military Decisions, pp. 478-479.

Congress followed Admiral Conolly's lead in the fall of 1949 and a number of congressional "junkets" were undertaken. Senator McCarran departed on September 14, announcing his intention to talk to Franco about possible loans. President Truman retorted that the Senator was going as a private citizen and did not represent the administration.[16] A subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee headed by Senator Dennis Chavez visited Spain in November, and announced that full diplomatic relations should be restored with Spain, and some sort of economic aid should be considered.[17] The Truman administration remained unmoved in its unfriendly attitude toward the Franco government, in spite of congressional pressure. It should be pointed out that Secretary of State Acheson was not unalterably opposed to Franco; he was loyal to the President, and felt a change in attitude toward Franco at that time would jeopardize successful negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. In May 1949 Acheson said that the United Nations recommendation on the withdrawal of ambassadors was important mainly because it had "become a symbol" to the Western democracies.[18] Also, the United States had never broken diplomatic relations with Spain; Truman had withdrawn his ambassador in 1945, and a charge d'affaires headed the American mission in Spain.

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16. The New York Times, September 16, 1949, p. 3.

17. Ibid., November 2, 1949, p. 9.

18. Ibid., May 12, 1949, p. 1.

Congress continued to press the Truman administration to restore relations with Spain as the second session of the Eighty-first Congress opened in January 1950. Lead by Senator McCarran, the Senate in August approved a $100 million loan to Spain, by a vote of 65-15. A House-Senate Conference approved a $62.5 million loan, which was tied to the President's Point Four appropriation request. Although President Truman had denounced the initial Senate bill, he buckled under to maintain Point Four. In signing the General Appropriations bill on September 6, Truman announced that he refused to consider the Spanish loan "mandatory" and that the money would be loaned "whenever such loans will serve the interest of the United States in the conduct of foreign relations."[19]

The Navy took no public part in the Congressional drive to attain closer ties with Franco during this period. In July 1950 Senator McCarran held a meeting attended by a few senators and military representatives. Apparently the military officers developed the strategic arguments to be used by the congressmen in the House and Senate. McCarran reported on this meeting in a Saturday Evening Post article, putlished the following April, and described the dilemma facing the military:[20]

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19. Ibid., September 7, 1950, pp. 1, C-36.

20. Pat McCarran, "Why Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for Us?," Saturday Evening Post, April 28, 1951, quoted in Lowi, American Civil-Military Decisions, p. 686.

> Political decisions belong to the State Department and the White House, and the President had made it clear he wanted no relations with Spain. This left technical men in a spot. They could not openly advocate a policy which frightened their superiors, let alone contradict the President, yet their blueprints did just that. Unofficially, the lower echelon made known its views. The meeting in my office was just one of many in Washington.

Less than two months later, the General Assembly of the United Nations formally repealed the portion of its 1946 resolution on Spain recommending the withdrawal of ambassadors, with American support. Most of the supporters of the earlier resolution had since disregarded it anyway. President Truman, however, appeared adamant in his opposition to the Franco government until December 27, when he announced the nomination of Stanton Griffis as Ambassador to Spain. Griffis had been the American Ambassador to Poland until 1948, when he was transferred to Egypt. He told James Forrestal in May 1948, when he was offered the Egyptian post, that he would have preferred Spain. Griffis said he found it difficult to understand how the United States could talk about the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and ignore the other points, since there was no Ambassador in Spain.[21]

During the long Congressional debates, although Truman's public policy toward Spain did not change, the State and Defense Departments were working on a policy paper for Spain, which included

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21. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 445.

military assessments of the need for American bases in that country. This paper, never made public, was presented to the National Security Council in January, 1951. Griffis was dispatched with instructions to investigate the possibility of negotiations for bases, and the Ambassadors in France and Great Britain were instructed to sound out the attitudes of American allies toward including Spain in plans for the defense of Europe.[22]

The military's interest in Spanish bases had not been publicized by mid-1951, when Admiral Sherman received permission from the President to visit Madrid on an official European tour. Sherman had been active in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pressing for military arrangements with Spain, since assigned as CNO in 1949. When the Admiral left for Europe on July 16, the Department of Defense said only that he was traveling to familiarize himself with European military conditions prior to a NATO defense ministers meeting in September. Then on July 18, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, announced one important facet of Admiral Sherman's trip. The Secretary said:[23]

> Military authorities are in general agreement that Spain is of strategic importance to the general defense of Western Europe. As a natural corollary to this generally accepted conclusion, tentative and exploratory conversations have been under-

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22. Lowi, American Civil-Military Decisions, pp. 690-691.

23. Dean Acheson, "U.S. Begins Conversations on Spain's Role in European Defense," Press Conference of July 18, 1951, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 631, July 30, 1951, p. 170.

> taken with the Spanish Government with the sole purpose of ascertaining what Spain might be willing and able to do which would contribute to the strengthening of the common defense against possible aggression.

Acheson went on to say that the United States had been unable to come to agreements with Great Britain and France over a possible role for Spain. He added that any understanding that might be reached with Franco would "supplement our basic policy of building the defense strength of the West," and that the country's main commitment was to NATO. The following day President Truman acknowledged that his administration had officially changed its policy toward Spain, as a result of "advice by the Department of Defense."[24]

A good deal of work remained, however, before these bases would become more than political goals. A military survey team headed by an Air Force general spent several months in Spain and reported somewhat pessimistically in January. The team recognized the strategic need for air and naval bases in Spain, but questioned if these bases would be available in the event of war.[25] Meanwhile, the Air Force was busy building bases in North Africa. The Navy continued to visit Spanish ports in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, meeting with enthusiastic receptions, and lavishing compliments on the Spaniards.[26]

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24. The New York Times, July 20, 1951, p. 1.

25. Ibid., January 4, 1952, p. 1.

26. Ibid., January 11, 1952, p. 4, and June 28, 1952, p. 13.

Finally, on March 12, 1952, Secretary Acheson announced the formal opening of negotiations. Newly-appointed Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh was to be assisted in the negotiations by a special military advisory team.[27]

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's inauguration did not slow the negotiations. Ambassador James C. Dunn, MacVeagh's replacement, said on April 9, 1953, that "we want the bases to strengthen the cordial relations existing between our two countries," which are important to the defense of Western Europe.[28]

Finally, on September 26, 1953, Ambassador Dunn and Spanish Foreign Minister Alberto Martin Artajo signed three bilateral agreements calling for the construction and use of military facilities by the United States in Spain, economic aid, and a mutual defense assistance agreement. The bases were to remain under Spanish jurisdiction, under the Spanish flag and command.[29]

The Navy's reward for six years of effort was a base at Rota, near Cadiz on the Atlantic side of Gibralter, formally occupied in 1958. This installation continues to serve as a fueling and supply

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27. Dean Acheson, "Negotiations With Spain on Military Facilities," Press Conference of March 12, 1952, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 665, March 24, 1952, p. 450.

28. The New York Times, April 10, 1952, p. 4.

29. "Agreements Concluded with Spain," Press release 519 dated September 26, 1953, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 745, October 5, 1953, pp. 435-436.

base and as the main point of entry for naval transport aircraft from the United States to the Mediterranean. The establishment of a nuclear submarine base at Rota is a more recent development. The Rota installation was intended to be the headquarters of the Sixth Fleet. This did not develop, as the Navy developed logistic facilities in Naples, Italy.

Congress, the Truman administration and the so-called "Spanish Lobby" were all involved in the controversy over relations with Spain after World War II. The military - particularly the Navy - played an important part in changing President Truman's mind, but not the major part. What is important to this study is the Navy's cooperation with Congress on an unofficial basis, helping Congressmen and Senators to prepare their statements for committee hearings. The Navy did not contribute directly to their case in open testimony. Navy Secretaries John L. Sullivan and Francis P. Matthews supported their military subordinates, as did Defense Secretaries James Forrestal and Louis A. Johnson. When George C. Marshall became Secretary of Defense in 1950, he did not hinder the military's efforts although he did not actively support them.

Pressures from Congress and "advice" from the Defense Department notwithstanding, the most important factor in Truman's policy change was his decision in 1951 to concentrate the country's defense effort on Europe and negotiate a truce in Korea. The military was able to convince the President that naval and air bases in Spain would

enhance the defense effort in Western Europe. The inordinate length of time it took the Administration to announce its policy and complete negotiations was largely due to attempts to avoid offending America's NATO allies, and Franco's insistence that Spain should retain jurisdiction over American installations.

CHAPTER VI

THE NAVY LOBBY

To compete in the complex milieu of modern government the military has been forced to abandon its traditional disdain for politics. While not "political" in the commonly accepted sense, the Navy has greatly expanded and refined its activities in this area. By bureaucratizing their lobbying activities, Naval officers are able to think they are carrying out their responsibilities to Congress and the Executive without engaging in politics.

Before World War II, assistance to Congress was handled through the Office of the Judge Advocate General, and consisted largely of providing the answers to legal questions supplied by congressmen.[1] Any lobbying was carried out by the semi-autonomous bureaus directly with Congress.

The system first changed in 1956, when the Office of Legislative liaison was taken from the Judge Advocate General and put directly under the Secretary of the Navy. A rear admiral was named Chief of Legislative Liaison, "directly responsible to the Secretary of the

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1. Julius Augustus Furer, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired), Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington: G.P.O., 1959), p. 640.

Navy for legislative matters and congressional relations (except appropriations matters)."[2] In 1957 the Secretary of Defense moved to centralize congressional relations under his control, by creating an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative affairs). In 1959 the Defense Department and Congress reduced the number of personnel assigned to each service's legislative liaison offices.

In spite of these seeming restrictions the Navy's legislative liaison activities continued unimpaired because "legislative liaison" by definition does not include appropriations bills. Budgetary matters are assigned to the Office of the Comptroller, both in the service departments and at the level of the Department of Defense. In 1960 the title of the Office of Legislative Liaison was changed to the Office of Legislative Affairs, and its authority expanded to include liaison with the executive branch of the government and non-governmental agencies, as well as with Congress.[3] The Office of Legislative Affairs became the Navy's primary lobbying agency.

Navy public relations has origins as obscure as legislative affairs. Until 1941 public relations was a branch of naval intelligence staffed mainly by civilians. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox designated the Office of Public Relations to be directly responsible to the Secretary, and every Navy unit was to have an officer assigned

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2. SECNAV Instruction 5430.26A of July 15, 1956.

3. SECNAV Instruction 5430.26B of June 11, 1960.

to handle public relations and information. In 1944 James Forrestal was named Secretary of the Navy, and began his campaign to urge naval officers to inform the public about the Navy. In 1945 he organized a new Office of Public Information and convinced Congress to approve a category of special duty public information officers.[4] Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews in 1950 created the billet of Chief of Information, a rear admiral assigned to work jointly for the Secretary and for the Chief of Naval Operations.

In addition, the Navy from time to time has organized ad hoc groups responsible to the Secretary and to the Chief of Naval Operations for organizing the service's political strategy. The first of such groups consisted of a few members of the General Board who took it upon themselves to organize the Navy's testimony before the Woodrum Committee in 1944. Secretary Forrestal apparently had this group in mind in October 1945 when he organized the Secretary's Committee on Research on Reorganization - known within the Department as SCORER - under Vice Admiral Arthur A. Radford. The committee was given the responsibility to prepare the Navy's position and strategy for the unification hearings that were about to begin. SCORER disbanded after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, in the belief that the unification struggle had been settled. Two of the original members of the committee, Rear Admirals Robert Carney and Forrest

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4. Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 267-273.

Sherman, later served as Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Radford served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The functional successor to SCORER was the Organizational Policy and Research Division (Op-23) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, organized by Admiral Louis E. Denfield and headed by Captain Arleigh A. Burke. Op-23 was formed in December 1948 and prepared the Navy's presentation to the House Armed Services Committee in the "B-36 controversy" of 1949.[5] During the hearings, Secretary Matthews ordered the Navy Inspector General to investigate Op-23. Nothing incriminating was discovered, but the division was abolished by Admiral Forrest Sherman, the new CNO.

Captain Burke's activities in Op-23 nearly cost the Navy one of its most gifted leaders when Secretary Matthews tried to prevent Burke's selection for promotion to Rear Admiral. Republicans in the House were already unhappy over the President's summary dismissal of Admiral Denfield as Chief of Naval Operations. The President himself resolved the matter by adding Burke's name to the Rear Admiral promotion list.

The next special agency created in the CNO's office was the Long-Range Objectives Group, organized in 1955 and still functioning under the Director, Navy Program Planning. This group was to

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5. Paul W. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," American Civil-Military Decisions, Harold Stein, ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 525, 548.

project long-term requirements for the Navy.[6] A number of related planning and evaluation groups were organized by Admiral Burke during his tour as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961. They include the Naval Long-Range Studies Project, the Naval Warfare Analysis Group and the Operations Evaluation Group. Their functions are coordinated under the Navy Program Planning Office, although the titles change periodically.

The Progress Analysis Group, established in 1950 in the CNO's office, was one ad hoc group that did become involved in congressional lobbying. They put together the "CNO Sea Power Series," consisting of film strips, motion pictures, and illustrated lectures, used in the annual presentation to Congress and widely deseminated among Navy and Naval Reserve Units and select groups of civilians.[7] The Progress Analysis Group flourished under Admiral Burke as a vigorous exponent of the Navy's views, and has since been absorbed by the Program Planning Office.

The Army and the Air Force have also increased public and legislative activities since World War II with two offices at the highest level directly responsible to the service secretary. Professor Huntington holds interservice rivalry responsible for this

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6. U.S., United States Government Organization Manual 1967-68, National Archives and Records Service, Revised June 1, 1967 (Washington: G.P.O., 1967), pp. 161, 168.

7. Davis, The Admirals Lobby, pp. 295-298.

expansion:[8]

> Interservice competition was a justification for, as well as a cause of, service political activities. Traditionally, and again immediately after World War II, service appeals to their officers to be public-relations conscious stressed the close interrelation of political and military affairs and the general responsibility of military officers to enlighten the public on the needs of national security.

Although "interservice competition" is a quiescent issue in military politics today, the services' legislative and public affairs activities have not abated. Each service maintains offices in Washington to keep members of Congress informed and to solicit their interest in particular problems - in short, to do many things done by conventional "lobbyists" or pressure groups.[9]

There is a distinct difference between a service lobby and a lobbyist representing private industry. The military offices responsible for legislative liaison are directly responsible to their respective service secretaries, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) coordinates all service legislative activities. Since the Office of the Secretary of Defense controls all liaison activities and obviously reflects administration views, the services do not present truly independent programs to Congress.

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8. Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services," Total War and Cold War, Harry L. Coles, ed. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962), p. 188.

9. Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 202.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) is responsible for the coordination of Department of Defense activities concerning congressional liaison including furnishing information, preparation of witnesses, legislative investigations, and the legislative program of the department. No service attempts to initiate legislation on its own, and the legislation initiated by the Department of Defense is referred to the services for comment in their particular areas of interest.

The responsibilities of the Navy's Chief of Legislative Affairs parallel those of the Assistant to the Secretary, but are restricted to the Department of the Navy. His office coordinates and supervises the Department's legislative program, including the preparation of reports and testimony, and processes replies to congressional inquiries and investigations. The office is responsible for the release of classified information to Congress.[10]

Military officers responsible for congressional relations operate in two areas, "legislative" and "liaison." The legislative function includes assisting Congressmen or Senators, or members of committee staffs, in the preparation of bills concerning the military. A related duty is to brief military personnel who are to testify before congressional committees, and to provide information to committee members. A good example of legislative liaison is the

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10. United States Government Organization Manual 1967-68, p. 181.

information provided to members of Congress in 1950 during the hearings on relations with Spain, described in Chapter V.

The liaison job is broader and more difficult to define. The services provide "assistance" to Congressmen and Senators, ranging from collecting information to organizing and furnishing transportation for official trips in the United States and overseas. Most overseas business is at the request of a committee chairman, and the services are particularly sensitive to requests from these powerful figures. Committee chairmen such as Congressman L. Mendel Rivers and Senator Richard Russell, of the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees, have decisive influence on the outcome of military legislation.

Much of the office's contact with Congress is through the staff members of the various committees. Many staff counsels are considered more influential than freshman members of a committee, as they have the "ear" of the committee chairman and have complete knowledge of the committee's activities.

The orientation junket is a particularly useful liaison activity. The services take members of Congress to bases, ships and special installations to show off the latest equipment and training programs. One legislative liaison officer told journalist Jack Raymond: "Our lobbying effectiveness is at its height, not here on Capital Hill, but in the field where we get the Congressmen to 'see for themselves.'"[11]

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11. Raymond, Power at the Pentagon, p. 203.

The office continually carries out "special projects," designed to educate congressmen about the Navy. Briefings are arranged, particularly for freshman members, as well as CNO breakfasts and meetings with the Secretary.

Congressmen receive a staggering amount of personal mail from constituents. Constituent inquiries from service members or their families, or concerning the Navy, are referred to the Department of the Navy for comment or investigation. Although some of these letters are clearly of the "crank" variety, each complaint or comment is investigated and a reply sent to the interested member of Congress. Frequently a complaint may precipitate the drafting of "relief legislation" for the Congressman to introduce on behalf of a constituent who has not received legal benefits. This particular activity by the Office of Legislative Affairs was aptly described as a Navy "ombudsman function" by a former staff member.

While legislative liaison officers conduct direct relations with Congress, public information officers try more indirect means of cultivating favor for service programs. Publicity ventures have burgeoned since World War II, when James Forrestal tried to make the Navy aware of the need to "sell the Navy" in an atmosphere of service competition for reduced defense budgets and what appeared to be a genuine threat to Navy air from the Air Force.

The Navy has reluctantly come to realize the validity of Secretary Forrestal's insistence on publicity. Vincent Davis believes

"the intentional seeking of publicity remained odious to many, and probably most, sea officers." Davis says tradition-minded Naval officers believe "selling the Navy's case to the public should not be necessary and, in any case, it was uncomfortably political in nature, not in accordance with the dignity of the profession."[12] This attitude certainly prevailed immediately following World War II, and although echoes of it remain today, the need for favorable publicity is generally accepted.

The Navy's Office of Information is officially charged with informing the naval service about the Navy as an instrument of national policy and security, and "the responsibilities and participation of naval personnel as United States citizens under the American concept of government and society."[13] The office stresses the "continuing importance of seapower," understanding the Navy's role today and in the future, the need for a modern fleet and growing Soviet naval strength.[14]

Public information has also been centralized in the Defense Department under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). His office "coordinates actions, as appropriate, with the military departments and other Department of Defense agencies having

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12. Davis, The Admirals Lobby, pp. 279-280, 282-283.

13. United States Government Organization Manual 1967-68, p.181.

14. Ibid.

collateral or related functions."[15]

Extra-service groups with no official status are a third means of influencing public and congressional opinion. These include the Navy League, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, The Reserve Officers Association and the Fleet Reserve Association. While the Navy appreciates support from these organizations, there is no evidence of any such group acting as a "conspiratorial ally" of the service.[16]

In contrast, the Air Force Association provides a powerful lobby for the Air Force. Unlike the Navy League, active duty Air Force Officers are permitted to join the Air Force Association although their participation is generally passive. The Navy League consists of civilian business and civic leaders who have a personal interest in the Navy and do not consider the League a political interest group.

A final element of congressional relations as practiced by the Navy is the least conducive to analysis, but is perhaps the most important - continuing personal interest and contact between the Navy and Congress. The least of this contact is formal testimony before committees, much of which may have been worked out

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15. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

16. Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 209-210.

in advance with friendly Congressmen or Senators. What is most essential to "telling the Navy's story" is for individual members of Congress to realize that the Navy is presenting an honest case in the best interests of the nation and the service. This may be "lobbying," a distasteful word to naval officers in its normal political context; but the intent of the Navy lobby is to execute the service's responsibilities to the nation and its civilian leadership by propounding programs that enable the service to carry out its missions.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Naval officers have traditionally disliked and distrusted politics. Until World War II this negative attitudewas compounded by a conservative, decentralized system of organization and a startling inability to recognize the Air Force's "Air Power" campaign as a threat to the Navy. When naval officers first awoke to the situation their first efforts were hampered by an astounding political naivete.

In the beginning of the unification struggle, naval officers relied on short-term expediencies and felt that success in a single political engagement brought the matter to a close. Had it not been for the forceful leadership of James Forrestal, the Navy would have fared poorly. At that time senior naval officers lacked political acumen and were reluctant and ill-prepared for political maneuverings. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke was the first senior officer to establish offices in the Navy to prepare long-term goals for the service and prepare political action progress.

The Navy's political activity has been largely directed to the Congress. For years naval officers distrusted the political aspirations of appointed officials, and focused on Congress as the locus of respectable civilian control of the military. Conveniently, this allows

rationalization of any lobbying activities as an apolitical part of their constitutional responsibilities to the legislative branch.

Even with the unification controversy ostensibly resolved, Navy-Air Force disaffection effects much of military political activity today. To die-hard elements of the naval officer corps the Air Force is a "presumptuous usurper" of Navy prerogatives, irresponsible toward the nation's security in opposing balanced forces to emphasize air power. Worst of all, the Air Force has no traditions to speak of. These opinions are held by a small and diminishing number of naval officers, but are indicative of the residual bitterness resulting from the unification battle.

The strategic argument that dominated the unification hearings and the "revolt of the Admirals" was not settled until John F. Kennedy's administration, and still appears on occasion. Even though the Korean War vindicated the doctrine of balanced forces, the Air Force continues its attempts to use strategic bombing weapons systems (the B-52) to limited war situations such as Viet Nam.

President Kennedy appointed Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense, and between them they firmly established civilian control of the military establishment as outlined in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Through the brilliant administrative techniques including systems analysis and the Planned Program Budget System McNamara took one traditional arena for service competition - the budget - and put it firmly in the hands of the Secretary.

Both President Kennedy and President Johnson have been directly involved in the conduct of military operations because of the highly political nature of limited war. Although military officers have become more involved in the formulation of national policy, they have less independence in the administration and employment of their forces.

Owing to strong, centralized control of the military in the Executive branch, the Navy has less opportunity for overt lobbying with Congress on behalf of service policies. Programs presented to the Congress by the Department of Defense have replaced those previously presented by the individual services.

Even the Navy's congressional relations and public information activities are "coordinated" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to present unified Defense Department proposals to Congress and the public. This system is designed to prevent public disclosure of the type of interservice bickering that distorted the unification hearings and the formulation of post-war military strategy.

These conditions make it necessary for naval officers to advocate service policies within the Executive branch, through the Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For this reason the Chief of Legislative Affairs was given more authority to establish contact with government agencies in the Executive branch. Accordingly, much of the advocacy of Navy programs previously conducted openly with Congress is now concentrated on the Secretary of Defense. Once

a Defense Department program is decided upon, individual service opinions are abandoned.

In spite of Defense Department centralization the Navy must maintain close relations with Congress. Congress demands access to military officers' professional opinion in carrying out legislative oversight of administration policies. The individual services' legislative affairs offices are also involved in acquiring support for Defense Department programs.

Most important to naval officers, however, is the alternative offered by Congress should the civilian leadership in the Executive branch decide on programs the Navy believes not in the interests of the service. From the Navy's point of view, what is best for the service is inextricably bound to what is best for national security. In such cases the officer corps may be willing to risk surreptitious advocacy of Navy policy in Congress, hoping for debate and discussion of the matter in congressional committees.

Even though the Navy may be advancing a parochial viewpoint, such advocacy does enable the Congress to perform its adversary role toward Executive programs.

The ultimate decisions on significant questions of military policy are made by the President. Although the civilian leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cooperate in evaluating such questions, the President will generally rely most heavily on the judgment of the Secretary of Defense.

The question of whether the Secretary of Defense can effectively pass judgment on all military policy is debatable. Certainly Secretary McNamara's system is more efficient than those previously used in the Department, but errors in judgment may prove more difficult to discover and more expensive to correct. The efficacy of this system may depend on such subjective qualities as the personalities and abilities of the Secretary of Defense and his immediate staff.

Accordingly, naval officers are convinced of the necessity of avenues to Congress. The officer corps believes that the national interest is best served by Congress taking an active role in matters of national security policy.

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